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Abstract
This Article examines the overlooked countertrend of international trade regulation. It offers
a theory of internationally regulated goods (”IRGs”) that explains why certain goods are regulated
internationally, how governments form their preferences on international regulation, and how they
establish cooperation. This Article argues that international regulation allows governments to
make up for the deficiencies of national regulation by inducing the externalities-generating coun-
tries to establish proper controls. Beyond identifying and analyzing the trend of internationally
regulated goods, this Article makes several additional contributions. Most importantly, the the-
oretical model bridges rationalist and nonrationalist accounts of international law by combining
self-interest calculations with morally-inspired motivations. In my theory, governments respond
to material influences, such as interest group pressure, yet they may also harbor value-inspired
concerns for the welfare of foreign countries. The theory can therefore answer puzzling ques-
tions such as: Why did the United States launch a worldwide campaign against human trafficking
in 2000? Why has the United States accepted the international regulation of antiquities, to the
benefit of foreign countries facing archaeological plunder and to the detriment of the American
art market? The theory developed in this Article also sheds light on international cooperation
against small arms proliferation and misuse, money laundering, counterfeiting, and a host of other
problems that threaten international security, the international economy, and human welfare. The
Article is organized as follows. Part II documents the trend of internationally regulated goods
and explains its causes. Part III theorizes government preferences on international regulation and
accounts for their considerable variation. Part IV examines how cooperation is established in light
of the conflicting preferences of governments. Part V concludes with implications for policy and
for international law scholarship.
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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most significant developments in international
law in recent decades has been the proliferation of agreements
on trade liberalization.' Through the various agreements, most
notably those constituting the World Trade Organization
("WTO"), governments have dramatically lowered trade barriers
and thereby encouraged and facilitated trade.2 Scholars of inter-
national law and political economy have focused much attention
on the move to freer trade. They have carefully examined the
origins and implications of countries' choices to join the world
trading system and remove protectionist barriers.' Indeed, the
literature suggests that world trade has been moving invariably
in one direction, toward greater liberalization and openness. I
argue, however, that this conventional wisdom has overlooked a
distinct trend that runs in the opposite direction. Whereas world
trade in general has indeed become more liberalized in recent decades,
trade in specific goods has become more controlled and significantly less
free. Through a set of international regulatory agreements, gov-
ernments have increasingly controlled a growing list of goods,
from drugs to antiquities to diamonds to small arms. The pur-
pose of these regulatory agreements is to reduce the negative ex-
ternalities for society resulting from uncontrolled trade in these
* Visiting Assistant Professor, Cornell Law School; Ph.D., Government, Harvard
University; LL.B., Tel Aviv University. For helpful advice and comments, I thank Beth
Simmons, Jack Goldsmith, Michael Hiscox, Andy Kydd, Lisa Martin, Brett Frischmann,
Pierre Verdier, and participants in the Winter 2008 Roundtable at Vanderbilt Law
School.
1. See Edward Mansfield & Eric Reinhardt, Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism:
The Effects of GATTI/WTO on the Formation of Preferential Trading Arrangements, 57 INT'L
ORG. 829 (2003).
2. SeeJudith Goldstein et al., Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the
Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade, 61 INT'L ORG. 37 (2007).
3. See, e.g., Helen Milner & Keiko Kubota, Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and
Trade Policy in the Developing Countries, 59 INT'L ORG. 107 (2005). On the world trading
system, seeJOHN H. JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY, THE WTO, AND CHANGING FUNDAMENTALS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006); MICHAEL TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION
or INTERNATIONAL TRADE (3rd ed. 2005); Andrew T. Guzman, Global Governance and the
WTO, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 303 (2004).
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goods, such as crime associated with widespread drug abuse,
archaeological destruction caused by the plunder of antiquities,
the financing of rebel military campaigns through the sale of
diamonds, and fatalities resulting from the proliferation of small
arms.
This Article examines the overlooked countertrend of inter-
national trade regulation. It offers a theory of internationally
regulated goods ("IRGs") 4 that explains why certain goods are
regulated internationally, how governments form their prefer-
ences on international regulation, and how they establish coop-
eration. This Article argues that international regulation allows
governments to make up for the deficiencies of national regula-
tion by inducing the externalities-generating countries to estab-
lish proper controls. Two groups of governments, therefore,
support international regulation: governments facing the trade's
negative externalities upon their own countries (primary exter-
nalities) and governments concerned about the trade's negative
effects on foreign countries (secondary externalities). The latter
may come to support regulation under pressure from value-moti-
vated groups committed to worldwide suppression of trade that
they deem harmful. Pro-regulation governments, however, meet
with resistance from governments that wish to maintain the
trade uncontrolled. Those anti-regulation governments act in
the interest of domestic actors who benefit from unregulated
trade, such as arms manufacturers, antiquities dealers, or drug
exporters. With little shared interest among governments, the
political conflict ends in weaker regulation if the governments
resisting regulation are more powerful, and in stronger regula-
tion if the governments favoring regulation are more powerful.
Beyond identifying and analyzing the trend of internation-
ally regulated goods, this Article makes several additional contri-
butions. Most importantly, the theoretical model bridges ration-
alist and nonrationalist accounts of international law by combin-
ing self-interest calculations with morally-inspired motivations.
In my theory, governments respond to material influences, such
as interest group pressure, yet they may also harbor value-in-
4. I use the abbreviation IRGs (internationally regulated goods) to denote the set
of goods that this Article examines. These goods become regulated only at the end of a
political process. For the sake of convenience, however, I employ this abbreviation
throughout the analysis.
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spired concerns for the welfare of foreign countries. The theory
can therefore answer puzzling questions such as: Why did the
United States launch a worldwide campaign against human traf-
ficking in 2000? Why has the United States accepted the interna-
tional regulation of antiquities, to the benefit of foreign coun-
tries facing archaeological plunder and to the detriment of the
American art market? The theory developed in this Article also
sheds light on international cooperation against small arms
proliferation and misuse, money laundering, counterfeiting, and
a host of other problems that threaten international security, the
international economy, and human welfare.5
The Article is organized as follows. Part II documents the
trend of internationally regulated goods and explains its causes.
Part III theorizes government preferences on international regu-
lation and accounts for their considerable variation. Part IV ex-
amines how cooperation is established in light of the conflicting
preferences of governments. Part V concludes with implications
for policy and for international law scholarship.
II. WHY INTERNTIONAL REGULATION?
A. Documenting the Trend
The liberalization of markets and world trade is considered
one of the most important economic trends of the twentieth
century. In the aftermath of World War II, trade regimes in
most countries were marked by extensive and often prohibitive
trade restrictions.6 The years since have seen a growing integra-
tion of ever more countries into the world trading system and a
dramatic reduction of barriers to trade.7 A large body of politi-
cal economy literature explores the origins of trade liberaliza-
tion and offers various explanations for the lowering of trade
barriers.8 A similar focus has also characterized international le-
5. See, e.g., MoIsEs NAiM, ILLICIT: How SMUGGLERS, TRAFFICKERS, AND COPYCATS ARE
HIJACKING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2005); CAROLYN NORDSTROM, GLOBAL OUTLAWS:
CRIME, MONEY, AND POWER IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD (2007); TRANSNATIONAL OR-
GANIZED CRIME AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. BUSINESS AS USUAL? (Mats Berdal &
M6nica Serrano eds., 2002).
6. See Arcelia Quintana-Adriano, Legal Mercantile Evolution from the Twentieth Century
to the Dawning of the Twenty-first Century, 42 TEX. INT'L L.J. 831, 832-36 (2007).
7. See Milner & Kubota, supra note 3, at 111-15; Beth Simmons et al., Introduction:
The International Diffusion of Liberalism, 60 INT'L ORG. 781, 781-83 (2006).
8. See, e.g.,JOHN H. BARTON ET AL., THE EVOLUTION OF THE TRADE REGIME: POLIT-
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gal scholarship. Trade law scholars have written extensively on
trade liberalization, especially through the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), WTO, and the North American
Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"). 9 Both the political economy
literature and legal scholarship have emphasized a growing
trend of freer trade.
I argue that the scholarly focus on the reduction of trade
barriers has overlooked a countertrend.' ° Contrary to the gen-
eral trend of trade liberalization, the trade in specific goods has
come under increasing international control in recent decades.
Rather than liberalizing the trade in these goods, governments
have chosen to subject them to various rules and restrictions
through a set of international regulatory agreements:
The international drug regime was established prior to
World War I, was bolstered after World War II, and controls the
trade in drugs to this day. 1
Beginning in 1995, the United Nations ("U.N.") has been
leading a process intended to regulate the trade in small arms
and light weapons, producing the Program of Action on Small
Arms. l2
International efforts against the trade in persons for sexual
exploitation (human trafficking) originated in the early twenti-
eth century and received a boost in recent years under U.S. lead-
ICS, LAW, AND ECONOMICS OF THE GATT AND THE INTO (2006); Judith Goldstein, Ideas,
Institutions, and American Trade Policy, 42 INT'L ORG. 179 (1988); Goldstein et al., supra
note 2; Anne Krueger, Trade Policy and Economic Development: How We Learn, 87 AM.
ECON. REV. 1 (1997); Edward Mansfield et al., Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral
Control and International Trade Agreements, 56 INT'L ORG. 477 (2002); Milner & Kubota,
supra note 3.
9. See, e.g., ROBERT HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLU-
TION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM (1993); JOHN JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE
OF GATT AND THE WTO: INSIGHTS ON TREATY LAW AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS (2000);
JOSEPH WEILER, THE EU, THE WTO, AND THE NAFTA: TOWARDS A COMMON LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE (2000).
10. For a notable exception, see Chantal Thomas, Disciplining Globalization: Inter-
national Law, Illegal Trade, and the Case of Narcotics, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 549 (2003).
11. See Kal Raustiala, Law, Liberalization and International Narcotics Trafficking, 32
N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 89, 93-114 (1999); Thomas, supra note 10, at 559-63; see gener-
ally WILLIAM B. MCALLISTER, DRUG DIPLOMACY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: AN INTERNA-
TIONAL HISTORY (2000).
12. See DENISE GARCIA, SMALL ARMS AND SECURITY: NEW EMERGING INTERNATIONAL
NORMS (2006); GRADUATE INST. IN'T'L STUDIES, SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2002: COUNTING THE
HUMAN COST 203-22 (2002).
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ership. 13
The 1989 Basel Convention controls the trade in hazardous
wastes.1 4
A 1970 convention of the United Nations Educational, Sci-
entific and Cultural Organization ("UNESCO") and a 1995 con-
vention of the International Institute for the Unification of Pri-
vate Law ("UNIDROIT") regulate the international trade in an-
tiquities. 15
Starting in the 1980s, the international campaign against
money laundering has imposed various controls on financial
transactions. 16
The trade in wildlife is conducted in accordance with the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
("CITES"), adopted in 1973."7
Since 2003, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme has
attempted to ensure the legitimacy of the diamond trade and to
stop the trade in conflict diamonds.1 8
13. See Elizabeth M. Bruch, Models Wanted: The Search for an Effective Response to
Human Trafficking, 40 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (2004); Janie Chuang, The United States as
Global Sheriff Using Unilateral Sanctions to Combat Human Trafficking, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L.
437 (2006). See generally Linda Smith & Mohamed Mattar, Creating International Consen-
sus on Combating Trafficking in Persons: U.S. Policy, the Role of the UN, and Global Responses
and Challenges, 28 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFp. 155 (2004).
14. See KATHARINA KUMMER, INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF HAZARDOUS WASTES:
THE BASEL CONVENrION AND RELATED LEGAL RULES (1995); Kimberly K. Gregory, The
Basel Convention and the International Trade of Hazardous Waste: The Road to the Destruction
of Public Health and the Environment is Paved with Good Intentions, 10 CURRENTS: INT'L
TRADE L.J. 80 (2001); Theodore Waugh, Where Do We Go from Here: Legal Controls and
Future Strategies for Addressing the Transportation of Hazardous Wastes Across International
Borders, 11 FORDHtAM ENrvTL. L. REv. 477 (2000).
15. See PAUL BATOR, THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ART (1983); PATRICKJ. O'KEEFE,
COMMENTARY ON THE UNESCO 1970 CONVENTION ON ILLICIT TRAFFIC (2000); LYNDEL
PROTr, COMMENTARY ON THE UNIDROIT CONVENTION ON STOLEN AND ILLEGALLY Ex-
PORTED CULTURAL OBJECTS 1005 (1997).
16. See WILLIAM GILMORE, DIRTY MONEY. THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL MEA-
SURES TO COUNTER MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM (2004); Beth
Simmons, International Efforts Against Money Laundering, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLI-
ANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NoRMs IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 244 (Di-
nah Shelton ed., 2000); Guy STESSENS, MONEY LAUNDERING: A NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT MODEL (2000).
17. See ROSALIND REEVE, POLICING INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES:
THE CITES TREATY AND COMPLIANCE (2002); John L. Garrison, The Convention on Inter-
national Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and the Debate over
Sustainable Use, 12 PACE ENVrL. L. REv. 301 (1994).
18. See Daniel L. Feldman, Conflict Diamonds, International Trade Regulation, and the
Nature of Law, 24 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 835 (2003); Julie L. Fishman, Is Diamond
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The World Health Organization ("WHO") Framework Con-
vention on Tobacco Control, signed in 2003, aims at significantly
reducing the prevalence of tobacco consumption.1 9
The 1997 Landmine Convention bans the production, use,
and transfer of anti-personnel landmines.2 °
An optional protocol to the Convention on the Rights of
the Child bans the sale of child pornography.2 1
Combating the trade in counterfeit and pirated goods is
among the purposes of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS").22
As of 2008, twelve goods23 have become IRGs-they have
been subjected to international regulation through a set of
twenty-two global agreements. Table 1 lists all global IRG agree-
ments in force today.24 Note that while most of these agree-
ments take the form of legally-binding instruments, some do not
(for example, the Program of Action on Small Arms and the
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme). What unifies these
agreements, however, is their purpose: imposing controls on spe-
cific goods and restricting commercial transactions involving
Smuggling Forever? The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme: The First Step Down the Long
Road to Solving the Blood Diamond Trade Problem, 13 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REV. 217 (2005).
19. See Benjamin M. Meier, Breathing Life into the Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control: Smoking Cessation and the Right to Health, 5 YALEJ. HEALTH POL'y L. & ETHICS 137
(2005).
20. See Kenneth Anderson, The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines, the Role of
International Non-Governmental Organizations and the Idea of International Civil Society, 11
EUR. J. INT'L L. 91 (2000); Lesley Wexler, The International Deployment of Shame, Second-
Best Responses, and Norm Entrepreneurship: The Campaign to Ban Landmines and the
Landmine Ban Treaty, 20 Ajuz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 561 (2003).
21. See Cris R. Revaz, The Optional Protocols to the UN Convention on the Rights of the
Child on Sex Trafficking and Child Soldiers, 9 HUM. RTS. BR. 13 (2001).
22. See generally CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT (2007); INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT (Carlos M. Correa &
Abdulqawi A. Yusuf eds., 1998); KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2000).
23. See supra notes 11-22 and accompanying text. Money laundering is, in fact, a
service, rather than a good, as is human trafficking, the purpose of which is sexual or
labor exploitation. These services share many similarities with internationally regulated
goods, and I therefore include them in the analysis. Note also that a regulated good
can be, in fact, a category of objects. For example, "small arms" are weapons designed
for personal use, such as pistols, rifles, and shotguns, and "counterfeits" may be any type
of counterfeit goods.
24. For identifying IRGs, I relied primarily on PETER AINDREAS & ETHAN
NADELMANN, POLICING THE GLOBE: CRIMINALIZATION AND CRIME CONTROL IN INTERNA-
TIONAL RELATIONS (2006).
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these goods, thereby making the trade in them more difficult to
carry out. Such purpose is the opposite of the goal underlying
the WTO and other trade liberalization agreements, which is to
lower trade barriers and facilitate commerce.
Table 1. Global IRG agreements in force
Good
Drugs
Drugs
Drugs
Small arms
Small arms
Antiquities
Antiquities
Antiquities
Human beings
Human beings
Human beings
Human beings
Money laundering
Money laundering
Money laundering
Counterfeit and
pirated goods
Hazardous wastes
Diamonds
Agreement
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs
a
Convention on Psychotropic Substancesc
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances
d
Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate
the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons
in All Its Aspects' (Program of Action on Small
Arms)
Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and
Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and
Components and Ammunition, supplementing the
United Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime'
First Protocol to the Convention for the Protection
of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflictg
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer
of Ownership of Cultural Property ("1970 UNESCO
Convention") h
UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally
Exported Cultural Objects ("UNIDROIT
Convention")'
Slavery Conventioni
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of
Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and
Practices Similar to Slavey
Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in
Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution
of Others'
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking
in Persons, Especially Women and Children,
supplementing the UN Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime'
The Forty Recommendations'
U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized
CrimeP
U.N. Convention Against Corruption
q
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights ("TRIPS")'
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their
Disposal' ("Basel Convention")
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme'
Year
Adopted
1961"
1971
1988
2001
2001
1954
1970
1995
1926
1956
1949'
2000
1990
2000
2003
1994
1989
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Year
Good Agreement Adopted
Endangered Convention on International Trade in Endangered 1973
wildlife and Species of Wild Fauna and Flora ("CITES")"
plants
Landmines Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, 1997
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on their Destruction
("Landmine Convention") v
Child pornography Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights 2000
of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child
Prostitution and Child Pornography'
Tobacco WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control' 2003
aSingle Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407, 520 U.N.T.S. 204
(amended by 1972 Protocol).
"The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs is a consolidation and expansion of several
pre-World War 1I agreements. For the purpose of Figure 1, I consider 1945 as the year
of adoption.
'Convention on Psychotropic Substances, Feb. 21, 1971, 32 U.S.T. 543, 1019 U.N.T.S.
175.
'Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Dec.
20, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 164, 28 I.L.M. 493.
'Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms
and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.192/15 (July 20, 2001).
'Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts
and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/255, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/255
(June 8, 2001).
gFirst Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 358.
hConvention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231.
'UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, June 24,
1995, 34 I.L.M. 1322.
JConvention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, Sept. 25, 1926, 46 Stat. 2183, 60
L.N.T.S. 253, amended by Protocol Amending the Slavery Convention, Dec. 7, 1953, 7
U.S.T. 479, 182 U.N.T.S. 51.
kSupplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and
Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 18 U.S.T. 3201, 266
U.N.T.S. 3.
'Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the
Prostitution of Others, Dec. 29, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 271.
r'The 1949 Convention on the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons is a consolidation
and expansion of several pre-World War II agreements. For the purpose of Figure 1, I
consider 1945 as the year of adoption.
"Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women
and Children, G.A. Res. 55/25, annex II, U.N. Doc. A/55/383 (Nov. 15, 2000)
(supplementing the U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime).
'Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering [FATF], The Forty Recommendations
(June 20, 2003), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/7/40/34849567.PDF.
PU.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25, U.N. Doc.
A/55/383 (Nov. 15, 2000).
qU.N. Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/4 (Dec.
11, 2003).
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rAgreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197.
'Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes
and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 1673 U.N.T.S. 125, 28 I.L.M. 657.
'Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, available at http://www.kimberleyprocess.
com/documents/basiccore_documentsen.html.
"Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
Mar. 3 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES].
vConvention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of
Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211, 36
I.L.M. 1507.
'Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of
Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, G.A. Res. 54/263, U.N. Doc. A/
RES/54/263 (May 25, 2000).
'WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, WHA Res. 56.1 (May 21, 2003).
Figure 1 contrasts the well-familiar trend of trade liberaliza-
tion with the overlooked counter-trend of trade regulation.
25 100
90
20 80
4, 70 Ici ,-
15 60 ,
0 50
10 40
;Z 5 ,20 '6
10
1945 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
Year
-..-- IRG Agreements -- *- % of Countries with Closed Trade Policies
Figure 1. Trade liberalization and trade regulation
Note IRG agreements are plotted by year of adoption
The downward-sloping line represents the trend that the
literature has been focusing on-trade liberalization. The per-
centage of countries with closed trade policies has dropped from
about 90% of all countries back in 1945 to about 20% in 2001.25
25. Data on trade policy openness are from KAREN HORN WELCH & ROMAIN
WAACZIARG, TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND GROWrH: NEW EVIDENCE (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 10152, 2003). Their data update that of Jeffrey Sachs &
Andrew Warner, Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration, 26 BROOKINGS PA-
PERS ON ECON. AcrivTrv 1 (1995). A country was classified as closed if it displayed at
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Yet at the same time that governments have liberalized their
trade policies, they have also increasingly regulated specific
goods through cooperative international agreements. As the up-
ward-sloping line shows, the number of global IRG agreements
has grown steadily since 1945, and has increased precipitously
since the mid-1980s.
In addition to the global agreements, some of the goods are
also regulated through regional agreements (for example, Or-
ganization of American States ("OAS") Firearms Convention,2 6
Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking in
Human Beings,27 Bamako Convention on Hazardous Wastes28 ),
sub-regional agreements (for example, Nairobi Protocol for the
Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light
Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa 29 ),
or bilateral agreements (such as U.S.-Mali and U.S.-Nicaragua
agreements concerning the imposition of import restrictions on
archaeological material3"). In some cases, those non-global
agreements preceded the global ones. For example, regional
agreements on small arms in Africa, Latin America, and Europe
least one of the following characteristics: (1) average tariff rate of 40% or more; (2)
nontariff barriers covering 40% or more of trade; (3) a black market exchange rate that
is depreciated by 20% or more relative to the official exchange rate, on average, during
the 1970s or 1980s; (4) a state monopoly on major exports; or (5) a socialist economic
system. See Wacziarg & Welch, supra, at 190.
26. Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Traffick-
ing in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials, Nov. 11, 1997,
S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-49 (1998).
27. Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Be-
ings, May 16, 2005, 45 I.L.M. 14.
28. Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of
Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes Within Africa, Jan.
29, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 773.
29. Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms
and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa, Apr. 21, 2004,
http://www.saferafrica.org/DocumentsCentre/Books/NairobiProtocol/nairobi
ProtocolEng.php.
30. See Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the Republic of Mali Concerning the Imposition of Import Restric-
tions on Archaeological Material from Mali from the Paleolithic Era (Stone Age) to
Approximately the mid-Eighteenth Century, Sept. 19, 1997 (amended on September
17, 2007), available at http://www.culturalheritage.state.gov/Mali2007Mou.pdf [herein-
after U.S.-Mali Agreement]; Agreement Between the Government of the United States
of America and the Government of the Republic of Nicaragua Concerning the Imposi-
tion of Import Restrictions on Archaeological Material from the Pre-Hispanic Cultures
of the Republic of Nicaragua, June 16, 1999, available at http://www.culturalheritage.
state.gov/ni99agr.html [hereinafter U.S.-Nicar. Agreement].
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led up to the two global agreements. In other cases, the non-
global agreements followed the global ones. For instance, the
United States implements the 1970 UNESCO Convention
through bilateral agreements with countries facing archaeologi-
cal pillage. 31 The theoretical analysis in this Article focuses on
the global regulatory agreements.
B. The Causes of International Regulation
International regulation should be distinguished from na-
tional regulation. Governments regulate many goods on health,
safety, and environmental grounds. Such national regulation,
however, is largely a matter of national discretion and may vary
from country to country. In contrast, this Article focuses on in-
tergovernmental agreements that coordinate regulatory practices
and set international standards for controlling certain goods.
What does international regulation entail? The regulatory ar-
rangements vary in the scope of controls they establish. Some of
them, such as CITES, focus on the export and import of the
goods,32 while in others, the production, distribution, posses-
sion, or use of the goods may be the subject of regulation. The
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs is an example.33 Several
agreements have additional dimensions, such as raising public
awareness or fostering cooperation between law enforcement
agencies.34
The stringency of controls exhibits significant variation as
well. At the extreme, international regulation amounts to a total
prohibition on the production, trade, or use of the good. This is
the case with child pornography, counterfeits/pirated goods,
and landmines.35 For most goods, however, regulation involves a
31. See Asif Efrat, Governing Guns, Opposing Opium: The Politics of Internation-
ally Regulated Goods, 234-35 (2008) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard Univer-
sity) (on file with author). For examples see U.S.-Mali Agreement and U.S.-Nicar.
Agreement, supra note 30.
32. See generally CITES, supra Table 1 note u.
33. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra Table 1 note a.
34. See, e.g., Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade
in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, supra Table 1 note e. Sections
11.20, 11.41, and 111.18 address the raising of awareness to the problems associated with
small arms. See id. §§ 11.20, 11.41, 111.18. Section 11.27 encourages states to establish
trans-border customs cooperation and networks for information-sharing among law en-
forcement, border and customs control agencies. See id. § 11.27.
35. See, e.g., Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, supra Table I note w. Arti-
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set of rules, guidelines, and requirements for proper conduct of
the trade, rather than a complete ban. The Single Convention
on Narcotic Drugs requires the parties to allow the manufacture,
trade, and distribution of drugs only under license, and to per-
mit the export of drugs to any country only in accordance with
the laws of that country.36 The Convention also empowers the
International Narcotics Control Board to oversee the interna-
tional drug trade in order to "limit the cultivation, production,
manufacture and use of drugs to an adequate amount required
for medical and scientific purposes ... and to prevent illicit culti-
vation, production.., and use of, drugs."37 CITES distinguishes
between three categories of animal and plant species according
to the severity of threat of extinction and it establishes corre-
sponding requirements for export and import permits." The
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme involves standardized
certificates that must accompany international shipments of
rough diamonds, detailing the identity of the exporter and im-
porter, value of the shipment, and so on.39 Whether they involve
import and export guidelines, procedures for tracing and recov-
ery, or any other regulatory measure, the purpose of the regula-
tory agreements is to establish uniform standards for the treat-
ment of the goods. They subject the goods to internationally-
coordinated rules and practices and set barriers to their cross-
border movement.
Why have governments targeted certain goods with interna-
tional regulation? I argue that the motivation for international
regulation of goods such as small arms and drugs differs in im-
portant ways from the typical motivation for trade restrictions-
protection. Typically, the purpose of trade barriers, such as tar-
cle 3.1 (c) requires states to criminalize "Producing, distributing, disseminating, import-
ing, exporting, offering, selling or possessing for the above purposes child pornography
.See id. art. 3.1(c).
36. See Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra Table 1 note a, arts. 29, 30.
37. See id. art. 9(4).
38. See generally CITES, supra Table 1 note u. The species covered by CITES are
listed in three Appendices. Appendix I includes species threatened with extinction. See
id. app. I. Trade in specimens of these species is permitted only in exceptional circum-
stances. See id. Appendix II includes species not necessarily threatened with extinction,
but in which trade must be controlled in order to avoid utilization incompatible with
their survival. See id. app. II. Appendix III contains species that are protected in at least
one country, which has asked other CITES Parties for assistance in controlling the
trade. See id. app. III.
39. See Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, supra Table 1 note t.
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iffs and quotas, is to protect the income of certain sectors or
industries that are harmed by trade liberalization. 40 By contrast,
this Article examines international regulation aimed at curbing
the negative externalities of uncontrolled trade in specific goods.
While uncontrolled trade in these goods benefits exporters
and consumers, the trade also generates negative externalities,
that is, harmful effects on society.41 In some cases, societies in
the importing countries bear the negative externalities. Free
trade in small arms leads to gun proliferation and higher levels
of gun violence in gun-importing countries. Gun violence, in
turn, causes loss of life and injuries; increased costs of medical
treatment, policing, and care to displaced people; destruction of
physical infrastructure; refugee flows; disruption of health care
and education; and reduction in productivity, tourist streams,
and foreign investment.42 Free trade in drugs could lead to
widespread drug abuse in drug-importing countries, resulting in
crime, higher health care costs, and lower workforce productiv-
ity.4" Certain actors may indeed welcome the availability of guns
and drugs. Illicit drug-users may "benefit" from an abundance
of drugs, and both criminals and law-abiding citizens may wel-
come easy access to guns. But the cost for society of readily-avail-
able drugs and guns is enormous.
Whereas importing countries face the harmful effects of
free trade in small arms and drugs, in other cases, the exporting
countries bear the negative externalities of the trade. For exam-
ple, uncontrolled trade in antiquities causes looting and destruc-
tion of archeological sites in archaeologically-rich countries,4 4
40. See, e.g., 25 C.J.S. Customs Duties § 4 (explaining that one reason the U.S gov-
ernment enacts customs laws is to protect American industries).
41. See PAUL SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 208 (1947) (defin-
ing externality as a situation in which "individual's actions have effects on others which
he does not take into account in making his decision"); see also Ronald H. Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
42. See WENDY CUKIER & VICTOR SIDEL, THE GLOBAL GUN EPIDEMIC: FROM SATUR-
DAY NIGHT SPECIALS TO AK-47s 12-47 (2006); GRADUATE INST. INT'L STUDIES, SMALL ARMS
SURVEY 2006: UNFINISHED BUSINESS 189-213 (2006); GRADUATE INST. INT'L STUDIES,
SMALL ARM~is SURVEY 2005: WEAPONS AT WAR 229-65 (2005); GRADUATE INST. INT'L STUD-
IES, SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2004: RIGHTS AT RiSK 173-211 (2004).
43. See U.N. INT'L DRUG CONTROL PROGRAMME, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSE-
QUENCES OF DRUG ABUSE AND ILLICIT TRAFFICKING (1998), http://www.unodc.org/pdf/
technicalseries_1998-01-1.pdf.
44. See ILLICIT ANTIQUITIES: THE THEFT OF CULTURE AND THE EXTINCTION OF AR-
CHAEOLOGY (Neil Brodie & Kathryn Walker Tubb eds., 2002); TRADE IN ILLICIT ANTiQUI-
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and allowing the sale of "conflict diamonds" fuels conflict in dia-
mond-exporting countries. 45 As in the cases of small arms and
drugs, certain actors benefit from uncontrolled movement of an-
tiquities and diamonds. Subsistence looters-typically poor
peasants-receive small financial compensation for the antiqui-
ties they dig up, and the middlemen who move those antiquities
out of the country and sell them abroad make much larger fi-
nancial gains. When the diamond trade is free from control, re-
bel groups manage to sell diamonds and thereby finance their
military campaigns. For society, however, free trade in diamonds
and antiquities means net loss due to civil wars and archaeologi-
cal destruction.
Third countries, neither the exporting nor importing coun-
tries, may also face the negative externalities of trade. For exam-
ple, uncontrolled trade in small arms threatens not only those
countries that are awash with guns. Neighboring countries feel
the effects of gun proliferation as well through refugee flows and
obstruction of commerce, to name just two consequences. Pi-
rated goods are another example: as country A exports pirated
goods to country B, the results are lost revenue to the original
author in country C and the inhibition of future innovation.4 6
Uncontrolled trade in IRGs can impose harmful-even dev-
astating-externalities on society. The purpose of international reg-
ulation is to curb the negative externalities that these goods involve. By
regulating the trade in small arms, governments attempt to deny
guns to criminals, rebels, and terrorists while allowing gun pos-
session and use by security forces and law-abiding citizens. Regu-
lation of the drug trade aims to restrict the use of drugs to medi-
cal and scientific purposes. Controlling the diamond trade seeks
to enable consumers to purchase and enjoy the precious stones
without inadvertently financing conflicts in Africa. For conven-
tional trade, governmental interference through trade barriers
causes net loss, whereas trade liberalization enhances national
TIES: THE DESTRUCTION OF THE WORLD'S ARCHAEOLOGICAL HERITAGE (Neil Brodie et al.
eds., 2001).
45. See GREG CAMPBELL, BLOOD DIAMONDS: TRACING THE DEADLY PATH OF THE
WORLD'S MOST PRECIOUS STONES (2002).
46. Cf Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of
Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REv. 1455, 1458-59 (2002) (discussing how intellectual
property rights provide innovators the benefit of their investment and encourage future
innovation).
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welfare.4 7 The reverse is true for IRGs. Uncontrolled trade in
these goods could be harmful, and the purpose of international
regulation is to reduce such harm.
C. Why Is National Regulation Insufficient?
If indeed IRGs involve significant negative externalities, gov-
ernments should combat those externalities through national
regulation. Why is there any need for international regulation?
National regulation is typically the first step in addressing the
negative externalities of trade, but it often proves insufficient.
In many cases, national regulation exists on the books without
actual effectiveness. Countries in Africa and Latin America im-
pose restrictions on the import and possession of small arms, 48
yet they suffer from high rates of gun violence. Many archaeo-
logically-rich countries have laws that make all antiquities-in-
cluding those still unexcavated-the property of the state. Such
laws often prohibit any unauthorized removal and export of an-
tiquities. 49 Nevertheless, illegal export of antiquities continues
uninterrupted, notwithstanding the prohibiting legislation.
Why are national controls insufficient? There are several
causes. First, controls on the import or export of the goods do
not suppress demand. Demand for guns persists despite restric-
tions on import and possession, and limitations on the export of
antiquities do not lessen the interest of museums and collectors
in acquiring them. As long as demand exists, suppliers will
profit from meeting it. Buyers and sellers will therefore attempt
to carry on the trade, regardless of restrictions. The incentives
for suppliers to flout national regulation are especially great be-
cause many of the relevant commercial activities-such as antiq-
uities looting, drug export, and human trafficking-promise a
high yield with a relatively low-cost investment.5"
Second, law enforcement agencies have limited capacities.
Border control, customs, and police forces are never fully effec-
47. On the economic case for free trade and against protection, see THOMAS
OATLEY, INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: INTERESTS AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY 43-49 (2d ed. 2005).
48. See CUKIER & SIDEL, supra note 42, at 135-70.
49. See LYNDEL PRoTr & PATRICK O'KEEFE, HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL REGULATIONS
CONCERNING THE EXPORT OF CULTURAL PROPERTY (1988).
50. Note that information on the volume and value of the trade in IRGs is often
anecdotal and is, at best, a gross estimate. NAfM, supra note 5, at 11.
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tive, even in developed countries, let alone in developing coun-
tries where trained and equipped law enforcement personnel is
a scarce resource. A large territory or difficult terrain may also
compromise national control efforts. The larger the territory
and the longer the borders, the more difficult it is to enforce the
law and restrict inflows and outflows of goods. Moreover, restric-
tions on the trade drive the prohibited transactions under-
ground. Clandestine commercial activity is, of course, much
harder to trace and suppress. For example, once drug use or
antiquities export is banned, drugs users or antiquities looters,
respectively, attempt to hide from law enforcement authorities
and are therefore difficult to control.
Third, national regulation has become increasingly difficult
in recent years due to the growing openness of the global econ-
omy. Financial and overall trade liberalization, improvements in
communication and transportation, and the easing of restric-
tions on cross-border transactions have significantly hampered
the ability of states to enforce trade controls and have provided
greater opportunities to those who trade in IRGs. 5 For exam-
ple, the improvement of transportation infrastructure and distri-
bution networks has facilitated the trade in conventional goods,
but has also eased the cross-border movement of guns.5 2 Simi-
larly, the large increase in the volume of international trade has
unintentionally resulted in greater ability to hide drugs and an-
tiquities and has lowered the probability of interdiction and
seizure.
What, then, is the purpose of international regulation and
how does it augment national control? The key for understand-
ing international regulation is the variation in the negative exter-
nalities of the goods and the transnational nature of the exter-
nalities, that is, the incongruence between the countries generat-
ing the externalities and the countries bearing them.
I asserted above that IRGs involve significant negative exter-
nalities. However, such negative externalities vary considerably
across countries. For example, while gun violence exists in virtu-
51. See Peter Andreas, Transnational Crime and Economic Globalization, in TRANSNA-
TIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: BUSINESS AS USUAL?, supra note
5, at 37-40.
52. See CUKIER & SIDEL, supra note 42, at 88-108 (describing patterns and models of
the illegal trade in small arms).
53. See Raustiala, supra note 11, at 115-23.
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ally any country, the magnitude of the problem ranges from ex-
tremely rare incidents in some countries to everyday occurrences
in others. In 2002, Colombia's gun homicide rate was 51.8 (per
100,000); the equivalent rate for Egypt in 2000 was merely 0.02."
Rates of drug abuse also vary cross-nationally. In the United
States, 2.8% of the population aged 15-64 abuse cocaine-seven
times the cocaine abuse rate in Mexico (0.4%); the rate of opiate
abuse in Iran is 2.8%; in Japan, only 0.06%. 55 In other cases, the
externalities are heavy for some countries and nearly non-exis-
tent for others. Primarily industrialized countries bear the costs
of trading in counterfeit and pirated goods. Through flows of
conflict diamonds, the unregulated trade in diamonds has con-
tributed to civil conflicts in diamond-exporting countries such as
Angola, Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Si-
erra Leone. The trade in antiquities has caused major losses in
antiquities-rich countries, among them Mexico, Italy, India, and
Mali. 56 Developing countries-the dumping grounds for haz-
ardous wastes-have been the main victims of uncontrolled
waste movement.
57
The negative externalities of the trade in IRGs are therefore
borne disproportionately by a subset of countries. Other coun-
tries, however, generate these externalities and may actually gain
from the free movement of the goods. For example, whereas
small arms wreak havoc in Africa and Latin America, China prof-
its from exporting small arms, with annual sales estimated at one
hundred million dollars;58 the British art market has benefited
54. See CUKIER & SIDEL, supra note 42, at 36, 42.
55. See U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, 2007 WORLD DRUG REPORT at 242-43,
U.N. Sales No. E.07.XI.5 (2007), available at https://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/
wdr07/WDR_2007.pdf. U.S. data is for 2005; Mexican data is for 2002; Iranian data is
for 1999; Japanese data is for 2003. Abuse level is measured as annual prevalence rate:
the percentage of people who have consumed an illicit drug at least once in the twelve
months preceding the assessment. See id. at 264-65.
56. See PERNILLE ASKERUD & ETIENNE CLEMENT, PREVENTING THE ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN
CULTURAL PROPERTY 10-11 (1997).
57. See Valentina 0. Okaru, The Basel Convention: Controlling the Movement of Haz-
ardous Wastes to Developing Countries, 4 FORDHAM EN'VrL. L. REV. 137, 137-38 (1993). The
U.N. Secretary-General asserted that the "foremost characteristic of illegal traffic in
toxic and dangerous products and wastes is the dominant movement of these sub-
stances from the industrial to the developing world." See Sean D. Murphy, Prospective
Liability Regimesfor the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes, 88 Am. J. INr'L L. 24,
31 (1994).
58. See GRADUATE INST. INT'L STUDIES, SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2006: UNFINISHED BusI-
NESS 65-69 (2006).
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handsomely by selling antiquities looted from their countries of
origin;59 and pirated and counterfeit goods have been a source
of revenue for countries worldwide, including Russia, Vietnam,
and Turkey, among others.6 ° IRGs' negative externalities are
therefore transnational: the countries generating the externali-
ties are different from those bearing the externalities.
The transnational nature of the externalities results in varia-
tion of national regulation. Countries that generate the negative
externalities and gain from free trade in these goods often take a
permissive approach and establish loose national controls. Con-
versely, countries facing large negative externalities impose strict
national control on the production, possession, import, or ex-
port of the goods, as appropriate. As explained above, however,
national controls are rarely fully effective, and at times their im-
pact is no more than marginal. Cross-national variation in the
stringency of regulation between countries of origin and destina-
tion abets the trade and compromises even further the effective-
ness of one-sided national controls. For example, despite its
strict drug laws, the United States is unable to stem the flow of
drugs from Mexico if Mexican authorities do not suppress drug
export from or transfer through their territory. Mexico's at-
tempts to limit gun inflows6 1 cannot fully succeed due to the
ease of gun purchase in the United States.
As negatively-affected countries on their own cannot fully
curb the trade's externalities, they seek to augment national ef-
forts by strengthening control at the other end of the chain and
tackling the externalities at their source. For example, restricting
import of guns is easier if arms-exporting countries regulate gun
export. Similarly, unauthorized removal and export of antiqui-
ties are less likely to occur if market countries control the entry
59. See, e.g., NEIL BRODIE ET AL., STEALING HISTORY. THE ILLICIT TRADE IN CUL-
TURAL MATERIAL 23-25 (2000), available at http://www.mcdonald.cam.ac.uk/projects/
iarc/research/illici ttrade.pdf (estimating the financial value of the trade in illicit an-
tiquities in Britain). See generally PETER WATSON, SOTHEBY'S: THE INSIDE STORY (1997)
(discussing the involvement of the well-known auction house Sotheby's in selling looted
antiquities).
60. See OFFCE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATRE, 2007 SPECIAL 301 REPORT
(2007), http://www.ustr.gov/assets/DocumentLibrary/Reports-Publications/200 7 /
2007-Special_301_Review/asset uploadfile230l1122.pdf (listing countries in which
violation of intellectual property rights is rampant).
61. See Marc Lacey, Killings in Drug War in Mexico Double in '08, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9,
2008, at A17. See generally James C. McKinley Jr., US. Stymied as Guns Flow to Mexican
Cartels, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2009.
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of antiquities, as those countries' demand motivates the looting
of antiquities. Coordination of national controls-through in-
ternational regulation-is therefore a means to overcome the
limited utility of national efforts. Through international regula-
tion, externalities-bearing countries attempt to shift the burden
of control and induce the establishment of adequate restraints
by the externalities-generating countries. The international reg-
ulation of drugs and small arms seeks to restrain drug-exporting
and arms-exporting countries and make them reduce their ex-
ports' negative externalities. The purpose of regulating the an-
tiquities trade is to put curbs on market countries, so as to re-
duce the archeological plunder caused by demand from con-
sumers of antiquities: art dealers and auctioneers, museums, and
private collectors.
In short, international regulation aims to narrow the gaps in
national control and to converge regulatory practices on the
stringent side of the spectrum. By requiring that all states estab-
lish adequate controls, in particular those that are the source of
the externalities, international regulation aligns state practices
in order to curb the negative effects of uncontrolled trade.
D. Why Not a Coasian Bargaining Solution?
The Coase Theorem 62 suggests another possible solution to
the problem of trade externalities, which does not involve inter-
national regulation. According to Coase, actors facing negative
externalities can reduce or eliminate them by paying off those
actors generating the externalities. In the absence of transaction
costs, the parties should be able to strike an efficient bargain. Is
this a viable solution for addressing the externalities of the trade
in small arms, drugs, and other IRGs?
I argue that IRGs raise various difficulties that preclude the
type of contracting Coase proposes. First, financial compensa-
tion is simply irrelevant in some cases. Museums and art collec-
tors are unlikely to accept money as a substitute for antiquities
they would like to acquire. Payment is unlikely to convince gov-
ernments to eliminate landmines, if those governments consider
them to be a military necessity. Second, paying off the actors
that generate the externalities may not be financially feasible.
Poor countries bearing the externalities may not have the re-
62. See generally Coase, supra note 41.
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quired financial means. For example, African countries that suf-
fer from rampant gun violence cannot afford to pay off arms-
exporting countries to restrict gun exports. Given the lucrative
nature of the drug trade, even rich countries will find an interna-
tional regulatory framework cheaper than paying off all illicit
drug producers worldwide. Third, externalities-bearing coun-
tries will likely refuse to pay off those who benefit from illegal
acts. For example, paying off banks to stop laundering the pro-
ceeds of crime is not a morally satisfying solution. Paying off
those who export drugs to countries where those drugs are
banned is another bargain likely to be viewed as unjust. Since
national regulation is far from fully effective and a Coasian con-
tract unlikely, international regulation has become an essential
method for addressing trade's negative externalities.
E. International Regulation in Time
Turning back to Figure 1, why has the number of IRG
agreements increased dramatically over time, particularly since
the mid-1980s?6" I hinted at the answer earlier. The set of
processes known as "globalization" has to a large extent fueled
the trend of growing international regulation. As Andreas ex-
plains, overall trade liberalization has provided an effective cover
for illicit cargo. 64 Due to the increase in the volume of interna-
tional trade, illegal exports and imports have become more diffi-
cult to detect and seize. With more people and goods moving
across countries, effective inspection at borders and ports of en-
try has become a near impossible task.65 Privatization, financial
liberalization, and eased restrictions on foreign investment have
also had an unintended impact. Aimed at attracting legitimate
foreign capital, these reforms also allow for easier laundering of
crime proceeds.
Transportation improvements have had a dual effect as well.
For example, containerization-the packaging of goods in
sealed, standardized containers-has facilitated the movement
of legal cargo as well as the illegal export and import of goods.
63. See supra fig.1.
64. See Andreas, supra note 51, at 41.
65. See Raustiala, supra note 11, at 118-20. As Raustiala explains, increased trade
volume often entails streamlined customs procedures, which lower the probability of
seizures. Moreover, the large volume of trade has created an overwhelming workload
for customs agents, leading to less intensive and less effective inspections. See id.
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Criminals smuggling drugs into the United States have indeed
exploited the container revolution, which has allowed them to
ship larger amounts of drugs at a lower cost and a lower risk of
arrest than alternative methods, such as private planes or speed-
boats. 6 6 More generally, the increasing number of transporta-
tion routes and the lowering of transportation prices, while over-
all positive developments, have made illegal export and import
cheaper and easier.6 7
Finally, economic and political reforms in the 1990s have
facilitated illegal cross-border flows in yet another way. The so-
cial and economic disruption resulting from these reforms has
encouraged individuals to turn to the clandestine economy. For
example, agricultural reforms in Mexico and the drop in farm
incomes made farmers turn to illicit crops such as marijuana and
opium poppy.6 Economic hardship in Eastern Europe after the
fall of Communism forced young women to become prostitutes
abroad, where they fell victim to human trafficking. 69
The past twenty years have seen an increase in imports and
exports7° accompanied by a rise in the negative externalities of
trade. At the same time, states' abilities to curb these externali-
ties through national means were diminished. The accumula-
tion of these changes explains the growing turn to international
regulation since the mid-1980s. It is also interesting to note that
the first IRG agreements were adopted at the end of the previous
era of globalization. Booming trade, unprecedented capital
flows, and mass migration characterized the period of 1850-
1914.7" These trends led to the signing of the first agreement on
human trafficking in 1904 and the conclusion of the first drug
control treaty in 1912.72
66. See Andreas, supra note 51, at 40-41.
67. See Raustiala, supra note 11, at 117-19.
68. See Andreas, supra note 51, at 43-44.
69. See NOMI LEVENKRON & Yossi DAHAN, WOMEN AS COMMODITIES: TRAFFICKING IN
WOMEN IN ISRAEL 2003 19-20 (2003), available at http://www.hotline.org.il/english/
publications.htm.
70. See Milner & Kubota, supra note 3, at 107-08.
71. See generally KEVIN H. O'RouRKE &JEFFREY G. WILLIAMSON, GLOBALIZATION AND
HISTORY- THE EVOLUTION OF A NINETEENTH-CENTURY ATLANTIC ECONOMY (1999).
72. International Opium Convention,Jan. 23, 1912, 8 L.N.T.S. 187; International
Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, May 18, 1904, 35 Stat. 1979,
1 L.N.T.S. 83.
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III. GOVERNMENT PREFERENCES ON
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION
Inspired by the liberal school of international relations, I
argue that governments vary widely in their preferences on inter-
national regulation and that the sharp divergence of govern-
ment preferences is the greatest obstacle to international regula-
tion. According to Moravcsik, preferences are "an ordering
among underlying substantive outcomes that may result from in-
ternational political interaction . . . a set of fundamental inter-
ests defined across 'states of the world."' 73 The key question,
then, is how governments form their preferences on interna-
tional regulation. Which governments push for stronger inter-
national regulation and which prefer weaker international con-
trol?
I begin the analysis with conventional political economy ap-
proaches to trade policy. In trade models," the main actors are
industries or sectors, and the principal dimension of political
conflict is between exporting industries and import-competing
industries. Exporters, interested in gaining access to foreign
markets, support trade liberalization. Consumers, interested in
cheap and available goods, favor free trade as well. A collective
action problem typically prevents consumers from organizing
politically, yet they may influence governments as voters.7 5 By
contrast, industries facing import-competition suffer from trade
liberalization and support protectionism. Often better-organ-
ized and more politically effective than those who benefit from
free trade, import-competing industries lobby governments to
establish trade barriers and protect their incomes.
76
I argue that this understanding of trade policy, while a use-
ful starting point, does not adequately capture the forming of
government preferences on international regulation. The pro-
liberalization side of trade models-influence of exporters and
consumers-applies to IRGs as well, albeit with some important
modifications. But the fundamental difference lies in the anti-
73. Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International
Politics, 51 INr'L ORG. 513, 519 (1997).
74. My analysis refers to specific factors models, according to which trade politics is
driven by competition among industries. See OATLEY, supra note 47, at 74-77.
75. See, e.g., Mansfield et al., supra note 8.
76. See, e.g., Gene Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Protection for Sale, 84 Am. ECON.
REv. 833 (1994). On trade policy models in general, see OATLE, supra note 47.
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liberalization side. As Grossman and Helpman indicate by ti-
tling their trade policy model "Protection for Sale,"" conven-
tional political economy analysis considers protection as the pri-
mary purpose of governmental restrictions on trade. Tariffs and
non-tariff barriers intend, first and foremost, to shield import-
competing sectors from loss of income due to free trade. With
protection as the cornerstone, existing models do poorly when
goods such as guns or drugs are considered. For these goods,
the primary driver of trade restrictions is not protectionist de-
mands from local industries facing competition; rather, it is the
negative externalities of uncontrolled trade. Centered on pro-
tection, existing trade models are therefore unable to capture
and explain internationally regulated goods. Conventional mod-
els would take into account the interests of exporters and con-
sumers, who benefit from the trade, but not the broader nega-
tive ramifications of the goods for society. Therefore, their pre-
diction would be free trade in these goods, rather than
regulation. Understanding international regulation requires the
replacement of protection with negative externalities as the
main impetus for trade restrictions and control.
The following analysis first considers the anti-regulation in-
fluence of exporters and consumers on government preferences.
The pro-regulation influence of the trade's negative externalities
is then examined. This Article distinguishes between primary
externalities (the trade's negative effects on one's own country)
and secondary externalities (the trade's negative effects on for-
eign countries).
A. Exporters
In trade policy models, a simple commercial logic guides
exporters' preferences. Exporters are interested in open mar-
kets abroad and oppose impediments to selling their products.
They seek to lower barriers to their goods in foreign markets,
whether tariffs, non-tariff barriers such as quotas, or other types
of protection, such as health and safety requirements. This leads
governments, which are interested in exporters' support, to pur-
sue the opening of foreign markets and enhance export oppor-
tunities. Securing foreign market access for exporters has there-
fore been one of the chief drivers of the move to freer trade.
77. Grossman & Helpman, supra note 76.
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For example, Bailey et al.,7" as well as Gilligan, 79 conclude that
rising exports and increased lobbying by exporters played a ma-
jor role in the liberalization of American trade policy after
World War II. Exporters' interests have also been among the
underlying motivations for the GATT/WTO. Bagwell and
Staiger argue that "the WTO is driven by exporter interests" and
that "[t]he GATT member governments saw agreements to re-
duce tariffs as the most expedient way to increase the access that
their exporters could enjoy to the markets of their trading part-
ners."
80
To what extent does this logic apply to exporters of IRGs?
IRG exporters constitute a diverse group. They represent vari-
ous economic sectors and industries: agriculture (narcotic
drugs), services (banking, sex industry), manufacturing
(pharmaceuticals, small arms, hazardous wastes) and natural re-
sources (diamonds). In addition, the exporters vary in their de-
gree of domestic legality. Exporters are typically legal and legiti-
mate actors at home in cases where the negative externalities of
the trade fall on the importing country (for example, banks in
the case of money laundering or the small arms industry). How-
ever, in cases where the goods impose externalities on the coun-
try of origin, exporters may be illegal actors. Two types of illegal-
ity should be distinguished. Certain exporters are illegal since
their commercial activity has been banned by national legisla-
tion." Antiquities looters are an example: illegality comes from
their violation of national laws prohibiting unauthorized re-
moval and export of archaeological material. Other exporters
are illegal regardless of their engagement in the trade. Rebels'
illegal status comes from their desire to overthrow the govern-
ment, rather than from their sale of conflict diamonds.
How does international regulation affect exporters? On the
one hand, regulation may benefit certain exporters through its
78. See Michael Bailey et al., The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy: Rules,
Coalitions, and International Politics, 49 WORLD POL. 309, 333-37 (1997).
79. See MICHAEL GILLIGAN, EMPOWERING EXPORTERS: RECIPROCITY, DELEGATION,
AND COLLECTIVE ACTION IN AMERICAN TRADE POLICY 70-73 (1997).
80. Kyle Bagwell & Robert Staiger, The WTO as a Mechanism for Securing Market Ac-
cess Property Rights: Implications for Global Labor and Environmental Issues, 15 J. ECON. PER-
SPECrVEs 69, 70-72 (2001).
81. As explained above, such national legislation precedes the efforts for interna-
tional regulation. States resort to international regulation when they find their national
legislation ineffective.
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anti-competitive effects. By limiting the availability of the goods,
regulation may raise their price and allow exporters to reap a
regulation premium. 8 2 Various safety and quality regulations
can work to the advantage of those exporters already in compli-
ance, while driving out of the market those unable to comply.
Regulation can also be useful for public image or reputational
purposes.8 3 Exporters wishing to demonstrate their social re-
sponsibility may welcome humanitarian-inspired trade guide-
lines. More generally, meeting regulatory requirements may be
a certification of product quality.
I argue, however, that for exporters, the costs of regulation
are likely to outweigh its benefits. International regulation
could result in a total prohibition on the trade or a ban on cer-
tain transactions, could slow the export process under adminis-
trative requirements, and could increase the costs of production
and transfer of the goods. For example, many countries would
like to establish international transfer controls for small arms,
which would impose restrictions on arms transfers. Examples in-
clude a prohibition on small arms sales to unauthorized non-
state actors or a prohibition on selling arms if those might be
used for human rights violations.84 From the exporter's point of
view, transfer controls discontinue the practice of selling arms to
any buyer without screening and reduce the likelihood of receiv-
ing an export authorization. Transfer controls, in other words,
mean lost income. International regulation could, thus, impose
a burden on exporters, which is likely to be larger than the possi-
ble benefits both in magnitude and certainty. I therefore expect
exporters to regard international regulatory efforts as a threat to
their commercial interests, which trumps any concerns about
the negative externalities of the trade. Interested in maintaining
freedom of trade, exporters will likely try to steer the govern-
ment away from supporting international regulation. To what
extent will they manage to shape the government's preference?
82. On the anti-competitive effects of regulation, see, for example, Benjamin
Hoorn Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers?: An Economic Analysis of the Justifications for
Entry and Conduct Regulation, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429, 433 (2001) (arguing that attorney
regulation has resulted in inhibited competition and inflated prices).
83. On the use of regulation for public relations, see, for example, Andrew M.
Perlman, Toward a Untfied Theory of Professional Regulation, 55 FLA. L. REv. 977, 978-79
(2003).
84. On transfer controls for small arms, see GRADUATE INST. Irr'L STUDIES, SMALL
ARMS SURvEy 2007: GUNS AND THE CITY 117 (2007).
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Typical impediments to the political involvement of export-
ers have a smaller effect on the exporters of the goods addressed
here. Exporters, generally speaking, may not always be inter-
ested or willing to act politically due to the uncertainty of eco-
nomic gain. Exporters may judge that there are limited gains
from new markets or that the costs of lobbying overwhelm the
benefits of trade liberalization. The need to counter pressures
from import-competing industries may also lessen exporters' en-
thusiasm to organize politically.8 5 Such considerations, however,
are less likely to affect the calculations of IRG exporters. Inter-
national regulation involves a high certainty of significant loss
for exporters, which serves as a strong motivation for political
action. Moreover, IRG exporters typically do not need to over-
come resistance from import-competing sectors. As explained
below, opposition to the free-trade preference of exporters may
indeed come from principled actors, 6 such as the NGO-based
International Action Network on Small Arms, or environmental
groups, in the case of hazardous wastes. However, the limited
financial resources and electoral insignificance of these groups
make them easier to overcome than politically influential im-
port-competing industries.
Exporters are therefore likely to lobby the government
against international regulation, yet their ability to shape policy
may vary considerably across countries as well as across sectors
and industries. When exporters are few, they are better able to
overcome the collective action problem and organize for politi-
cal action."7 Some exporters can provide more political contri-
butions than others and "buy" the government's support. The
government may guard the interests of exporters that provide
many jobs or are otherwise important to the economy. Illegal
exporters-such as antiquities looters-do not have standing to
influence policy. They may not be able to lobby the government
or may have to resort to extra-legal means, such as threats.
Another determinant of the influence of exporters is owner-
ship structure, particularly whether the exporter is state-owned
or in private hands. In existing trade policy models, the govern-
85. BARTON ET AL., supra note 8, at 30-31.
86. I use the term "principled actors" to denote actors motivated by principles and
values rather than material incentives such as financial gain.
87. GILLIGAN, supra note 79.
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ment is a target for demands from interest groups and responds
to these demands so as to maximize its chances of staying in
power. The government, however, is not an active market actor
and has no commercial interests of its own.88 This is not the case
for certain IRGs whose exporters are state-owned. When this is
the case, the government does not merely respond to industry
lobbying. Rather, the government has a direct stake in the trade
as a source of revenue. It may therefore be particularly protec-
tive of exporters' interests and averse to international regulation.
But there may be other reasons for privileging state-owned ex-
porters. The management of state-owned enterprises is part of
the state apparatus. As "bureaucrats in business,"8 9 state-owned
exporters can therefore influence the government from within.
They may enjoy easy access to, and even close personal ties with,
policymakers, which makes lobbying easier and more effective,
compared to privately-owned exporters. Furthermore, a govern-
ment's inclination to support state-owned exporters may come
from their association with goals greater than financial profit,
such as national development or security. For example, state-
owned arms exporters are often considered strategic assets with
a key role in their countries' foreign and security policy.90 State-
owned banks in Iran have played an important part in the re-
gime's missile procurement and nuclear programs, as well as in
funding terrorism. 91 Contemporary governments are unlikely to
follow the example of Britain, who waged war twice in the nine-
teenth century over its right to sell opium in China. 92 However,
I expect governments to pursue uncontrolled or only weakly-
controlled trade when international regulation threatens the in-
terests of state-owned exporters.
88. One exception is the foreign direct investment model offered by Lee Branstet-
ter & Robert Feenstra, Trade and Foreign Direct Investment in China: A Political Economy
Approach, 58 J. INT'L ECON. 335, 343-47 (2002). In their model, the profits earned by
state-owned firms in China receive extra weight in the government's objective function.
89. See generally IWORLD BANK, BUREAUCRATS IN BUSINESS: THE ECONOMICS AND
POLITICS OF GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP (1995).
90. See, e.g., AHARON KLIEMAN, DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD: ISRAEL DEFENSE EXPORTS AS
AN INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY (1992) (in Hebrew).
91. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Remarks by Treasury Sec'y Paulson on Targeted
Fin. Measures to Protect Our Nat'l Sec. (June 14, 2007), http://www.ustreas.gov/press/
releases/hp457.htm.
92. See generally W. TRAvIs HANES III & FRANK SANELLO, THE OPIUmN WARS (2004).
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B. Consumers
The political economy literature typically claims that con-
sumers prefer free trade, which allows them to enjoy cheap im-
ports and raises their real incomes. However, consumers do not
shape trade policy through lobbying. The costs of protectionist
trade policy are diffuse, and the severity of the collective action
problem facing consumers makes their lobbying efforts negligi-
ble compared with producers.93 Rather, consumers influence
trade policy as voters. Governments lower trade barriers in or-
der to garner voters' support in future elections.94
What about IRG consumers? Like exporters, IRG consum-
ers constitute a diverse group. In some cases, consumers are nu-
merous (recreational drug users and gun owners, for example).
In other cases, their number is relatively small (for instance, mu-
seums and private collectors in the antiquities market). The
consumer may be the government itself (small arms)9 5 or an in-
dustry using the import to produce the final good (diamonds,
wildlife). As with exporters, consumers may be legitimate actors
who engage in overall legal activity (museums, the diamond in-
dustry) but also illegal actors. For some consumers, such as drug
users, the illegal status results from national restrictions on the
possession or consumption of the goods. In other cases, how-
ever, the illegal status is independent from the consumption of
the goods. Criminals and terrorists are illegitimate actors re-
gardless of their involvement in money laundering or their pos-
session of guns.
Consumers may be interested in the goods for various rea-
sons. Collectors purchase antiquities because of their aesthetic
or historical value or as a financial investment; rebels obtain
arms to overthrow the government; counterfeits are simply
cheaper than the original. Whatever the source of interest in
the goods, I assume that most consumers care only about their
own welfare and are indifferent to the negative externalities of
the trade. They are interested in unrestricted access to the
goods and oppose international regulation, which would make
the goods more expensive, restrict their availability, or eliminate
93. See OATLEY, supra note 47, at 78-79.
94. Milner & Kubota, supra note 3, at 115-17.
95. For data on government-owned small arms, see GRADUATE INST. INT'L STUDIES,
SMALL ARMS SuRvEY 2006: UNFINISHED BUSINESS 37-63 (2006).
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them completely. A minority of consumers, however, does take
into account not only their self-interest but also the damage
caused by uncontrolled trade; these consumers may therefore
welcome regulation. For example, museums are primary. con-
sumers of antiquities, but their public trust responsibilities re-
quire them to consider the archaeological looting fueled by
their demand for antiquities. Certain museums and museum as-
sociations have therefore supported the international control of
antiquities. 6 Such consumers, however, are an exception. For
the most part, I expect consumers to favor uncontrolled trade.
Yet despite their objection to international regulation, con-
sumers may face difficulties in organizing for political action.
One such difficulty is a collective action problem, the obstacle
for consumer influence emphasized by the trade literature. An-
other possible impediment-unique to IRGs-is a pre-existing
national ban on consuming the good. Gun owners or drug users
in countries that prohibit civilian gun possession or recreational
drug use may not be able to lobby in pursuit of free trade in
small arms or drugs. Since consumption is already banned na-
tionally, these consumers will find it difficult to shape the gov-
ernment's preference on international regulation. Similarly,
criminals cannot openly lobby the government to allow money
laundering.
But unlike consumers in trade models, which affect policy
only as voters, some IRG consumers may enjoy political influ-
ence other than through voting. Such is the case, for example,
when the government itself is among the consumers. Govern-
ments use small arms and landmines for national security pur-
poses. Certain poor governments have "imported" hazardous
wastes, that is, consented to the dumping of wastes on their terri-
tory in return for hard currency. 97 Although economists have
studied the issue of government procurement,98 conventional
96. For example, the Code of Ethics for Museums of the Museums Association in
Britain requires museums not to acquire an object if there is any suspicion that the
object has been stolen, illegally excavated or illegally exported after 1970 (the year of
adoption of the UNESCO Convention on the Illicit Trade in Cultural Property). See
MUSEUM ASSOcIATION, CODE OF ETHICS FOR MUSEUMS § 5.10 (2002), available at http://
www.museumsassociation.org/assetarena/text/cs/code of-ethics.pdf.
97. JONATHAN KRUEGER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE BASEL CONVENTION 88
(1999).
98. See, e.g.,JEAN-JACQUEs LAFFoNT &JEAN TIROLE, A THEORY OF INCENTIVES IN PRO-
CUREMENT AND REGULATION (3d ed. 1998) (1993); Simon Evenett & Bernard Hoekman,
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trade policy models do not consider governments to be consum-
ers. For understanding governments' preferences on interna-
tional regulation, however, one must take into account situations
where governments themselves consume the goods. By oppos-
ing international control, those governments wish to maintain
their ability to obtain the goods and use them.
Another category of politically active consumers includes in-
dustries that use the goods in the process of production (such as
the diamond industry), employers of trafficked migrant workers,
and consumers of antiquities-art dealers, auction houses, and
museums. In those cases, the number of consumers is suffi-
ciently small and the impact of the trade is sufficiently concen-
trated to overcome the collective action problem and allow con-
sumers to organize in order to promote their interests. For ex-
ample, the diamond industry established the World Diamond
Council to enhance its influence on the Kimberley Process and
shape the regulatory outcome in line with the industry's inter-
ests.99 The Association of Art Museum Directors, as well as indi-
vidual art museum directors, advocate against stringent regula-
tion of antiquities.'
C. Negative Externalities
Consumers and exporters of IRGs are typically interested in
uncontrolled trade. Uncontrolled trade, however, generates
negative externalities that drive governments' regulatory efforts.
I distinguish between two types of negative externalities: exter-
nalities borne by one's own country (primary externalities) and
externalities borne by foreign countries (secondary externali-
ties).
1. Primary Externalities
Primary externalities of trade are the negative material ef-
fects on one's own country resulting from the production, sale,
or use of the goods. Examples include gun homicide and drug-
user crime (externalities from use), financing rebel military cam-
Government Procurement: Market Access, Transparency, and Multilateral Trade Rules, 21 EUR.
J. POL. ECON. 163 (2005).
99. Carola Kantz, The Power of Socialization: Engaging the Diamond Industry in the
Kimberley Process, 9 Bus. & POL. issue 3, art. 2, at 11 (2007).
100. See, e.g.,JAMES CUNO, WHO OWNS ANTIQUITY? MUSEUMS AND THE BAYrLE OVER
OUR ANCIENT HERITAGE (2008).
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paigns through proceeds from diamonds (externalities from
sale), and archaeological destruction caused by unauthorized ex-
cavation of antiquities (externalities from production). These
negative effects are felt mainly by the countries of export or con-
sumption, but third countries may face them as well. For exam-
ple, gun violence in Africa triggers refugee flows that end up in
Europe. l01 Whereas trade models typically equate consumers
with the public, in the case of IRGs the public may have distinct
preferences from the actual consumers of the goods. Criminals
and drug users may favor uncontrolled trade in small arms and
drugs, respectively. The public, however, bears the negative ex-
ternalities associated with these goods and is interested in curb-
ing the trade.
Why would governments care about the trade's negative ef-
fects? Governments will, first and foremost, address externalities
that threaten them directly and undermine their control of soci-
ety, such as rampant gun violence or the financing of rebel cam-
paigns through conflict diamonds. Governments may also be-
lieve that their political survival depends on aggregate social wel-
fare. Failure to solve pressing social problems such as gun
violence or widespread drug abuse might result in loss of popu-
lar support. Another possibility is that actors negatively affected
by the trade lobby their government to take action. 10 2 It may
also be the case that policymakers are genuinely concerned
about public welfare out of a sense of duty and responsibility.
Governments therefore have various incentives to try and con-
trol the trade in order to reduce its negative effects. I expect two
influences on governments' level of support for international
regulation:
(1) Support for international regulation will increase with the
magnitude of the negative externalities. For example, the
higher the rate of gun violence or drug abuse, the greater
should be the government's support for international restraints
101. See, e.g., U.N. Dev. Programme, Armed Violence in Africa: Reflections on the Costs
of Crime and Conflict 4 (Oct. 2007) (written by Robert Muggah), available at
www.undp.org/cpr/documents/armed-violence/AV crime_conflict.pdf.
102. A case in point is the initiation of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS") by the United States under influence from U.S.
corporations seeking, among others, to combat counterfeit and pirated goods. See Su-
SAN SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS (2003).
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on the trade in small arms or drugs. The greater the scale of
archaeological looting, the stronger should be the government's
support for international control of the antiquities trade.
(2) Support for international regulation will decrease as the gov-
ernment's ability to curb the trade on its own increases. As
noted earlier, the need for international regulation arises out of
the insufficiency of control through national regulation. Gov-
ernments that cannot control the trade and curb its negative ef-
fects by themselves, for example, due to the weakness of law en-
forcement agencies, are more likely to rely on international reg-
ulation in order to establish controls at the other end of the
chain. International regulation allows those governments to
make up for their own regulatory incapacity. However, the
greater the capacity of the importing (exporting) country to
control the trade on its side, the less dependent it is on the con-
trol by the exporting (importing) country and the weaker its
need for international regulation.
2. Secondary Externalities
Concern about the negative effects of trade is not limited to
those governments whose countries face those effects. Certain
governments, motivated primarily by values and moral princi-
ples, may care about the trade's negative impact on foreign coun-
tries. I term such impact secondary externalities, that is, the exter-
nalities borne by countries other than one's own. In most cases,
concern about secondary externalities stems from the humanita-
rian implications of the goods. Gun proliferation and conflict
diamonds cause large-scale killing and maiming; hazardous
wastes spread disease. Other goods raise non-humanitarian con-
cerns, such as concern for the protection of cultural heritage
and archaeological knowledge in the case of antiquities.
Whatever the reason for concern, the focus of secondary exter-
nalities is the harm to others, rather than any tangible negative
effects on one's own country.
What fuels concern about secondary externalities? Why
would governments hold other-regarding, morally-inspired con-
cerns? Why is the United States so passionate against human
trafficking worldwide?1 °3 Why is Japan concerned about gun vio-
103. See Letter from Secretary Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Dep't of State, to Reader in
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 1 (June 2005), available at http://
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lence in Africa and elsewhere?' 1 4 There may be several reasons.
Some policymakers may genuinely care about suffering in for-
eign countries. The trade's externalities abroad may resonate
with their own values and motivate them to take action. In other
cases, policymakers may respond to the perceived interest of
elites and mass publics in an ethical foreign policy that includes
curbing the externalities of trade abroad. 1"5 Caring about
others, however, is not entirely selfless. Governments may ex-
hibit concern for foreign countries to improve relations with
them or to gain a better image. For example, one of the motiva-
tions underlying U.S. support for international antiquities con-
trol in the early 1970s was to improve relations with Latin
America, a region that had suffered from archaeological plun-
der.106
In yet another set of cases, identifiable groups of principled
actors place the trade and its negative effects on the agenda and
lobby governments to initiate or participate in an international
regulatory campaign. These groups share a value-based commit-
ment to worldwide suppression of trade that they deem harmful
and repugnant. Such principled actors may be transnational
networks of NGOs as well as domestic groups. For example, the
International Campaign to Ban Landmines ("ICBL"), initiated
by a group of six NGOs, developed into a network of more than
1400 groups in over ninety countries. 1 7 The International Ac-
tion Network on Small Arms ("IANSA") consists of 800 civil soci-
www.state.gov/documents/organization/47255.pdf. Yet for millions of people en-
trapped each year in vicious schemes of labor and sex trafficking, freedom is denied.
These trafficking victims are deprived of their most basic human rights and fall into
modem-day slavery. President Bush, the Congress, and the people of the United States
are united in efforts to eradicate trafficking in persons internationally and within na-
tional borders because this global crime opposes the universal value of freedom.
104. On Japan's efforts in the small arms area, see DIRECTORATE GEN., ARMS CON-
TROL AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, JAPAN'S DISARMAMENT AND
NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY 152-57 (2004). See also MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,JAPAN'S
ACTION ON SMALL ARMS (2006), available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/
disarmament/weapon/index.html.
105. See DAVID LUMSDAINE, MORAL VISION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: THE FOR-
EIGN AID REGIME 1949-1989 (1993) (linking the provision of foreign aid to humane and
moral convictions held by domestic actors and the general public).
106. LYNDEL PROTT & PATRICK O'KEEFE, 3 LAW AND THE CULTURAL HERITAGE MovE-
MENT 727 (1989); Ronald D. Abramson & Stephen B. Huttler, The Legal Response to the
Illicit Movement of Cultural Property, 5 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 932, 957 (1973).
107. See generally ICBL, http://www.icbl.org (last visited Apr. 22, 2009).
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ety organizations in over 100 countries.' 08 A coalition of four
European NGOs titled "Fatal Transactions" launched the cam-
paign against conflict diamonds.1 t 9 American missionaries in-
duced the United States to try and solve China's opium problem
through international drug control in the early twentieth cen-
tury. 110
What motivates the principled actors to care about other
countries' problems? In some cases, the principled actors may
have a stake in curbing the harmful trade. For example, Ameri-
can missionaries considered the Chinese opium problem as an
obstacle to their efforts to spread Christianity. t"' For the most
part, however, principled actors are inspired by values and prin-
ciples without a direct stake in the matter. The source of such
values may be religion. For example, the nineteenth century
anti-slavery movement in Britain relied mostly on a number of
Protestant Dissenter sects. In their view, slavery was condemned
since it kept the Africans from achieving salvation and might
have resulted in a divine punishment for Britain."1 2 Since the
late 1990s, American evangelical Christians, motivated by relig-
ious beliefs, have advocated U.S. action against human traffick-
ing worldwide.11 For other principled actors, motivation may
come from a diverse set of values and goals such as human rights
and humanitarianism, peace, development, environmental pro-
tection, and women's rights. The efforts of the archeological
community to promote control of antiquities are in the interest
of historical knowledge. 14 In fact, regulatory campaigns may
108. See generally IANSA, http://www.iansa.org (last visited Apr. 22, 2009).
109. See generally Fatal Transactions, http://www.fataltransactions.org (last visited
Apr. 20, 2009).
110. ARNOLD TAYLOR, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE NARCOTICS TRAFFIC, 1900-
1939: A STUDY IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN REFORM 30 (1969).
111. Id.
112. Chaim Kaufmann & Robert Pape, Explaining Costly International Moral Action:
Britain's Sixty-Year Campaign Against the Atlantic Slave Trade, 53 INT'L ORG. 631, 645-46
(1999).
113. One of the principal Christian groups involved in the efforts against human
trafficking is International Justice Mission. According to the group's website, its work
"is founded on the Christian call to justice articulated in the Bible (Isaiah 1:17): Seek
justice, protect the oppressed, defend the orphan, plead for the widow." Int'lJustice
Mission, http://www.ijm.org/whoweare (last visited Apr. 12, 2009); see also Efrat, supra
note 31, at 304.
114. A key claim made by archaeologists is that coherent information about the
past "comes only through the systematic study of context-of the association of things
found within the ground where they were abandoned or deliberately buried." The loot-
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bring together quite different principled actors. The anti-
human trafficking coalition in the United States, for example,
includes both women's rights groups and evangelicals, which are
normally on opposite sides of the political spectrum. 15
Principled actors campaign to make governments care
about the welfare of foreign countries. They advocate the con-
trol or elimination of trade that they consider reprehensible and
harmful to other nations. Why would governments pay any at-
tention? Governments may address the concerns of politically
powerful principled actors. After the 1832 Great Reform, Dis-
senters composed about twenty-one percent of the British electo-
rate.1 16 Often holding the balance of power between the two
major parties, Dissenters brought the government to support the
abolitionist cause and launch a worldwide anti-slavery cam-
paign."' Similarly, the electoral power of evangelical Christians
makes their concern about human trafficking an issue of interest
to American politicians.1 1 8 Yet the main strategy that principled
actors employ involves educating policy makers and raising their
awareness about the trade and its negative consequences. Edu-
cation and awareness-raising may involve multiple techniques.
For example, groups seeking to educate U.S. policymakers about
human trafficking set up interchanges between policymakers
and victims of trafficking, met with members of Congress and
their staff, testified at Congressional hearings, and voiced their
concerns through the press and letters." 9 To raise awareness
about China's opium problem, American missionaries met with
State Department officials and sent cables and letters to the Pres-
ing of antiquities leads to the loss of their context and hence loss of our knowledge of
the past. COLIN RENFREW, LOOT LEGITIMACY, AND OWNERSHIP: THE ETHICAL CRISIS IN
ARCHAEOLOGY 10 (1999); see also BRODIE ET AL., supra note 59, at 11. Brodie et al. state:
An ethnographic object without contextual information is an object stripped
of meaning-it reflects back at us our own conceptions of beauty but tells us
little of other people and other places. It leaves us ignorant of its original
social value and purpose or, worse, puts us at risk of misunderstanding them.
See id.
115. See Barbara Stolz, Educating Policymakers and Setting the Criminal Justice Poli-
cymaking Agenda: Interest Groups and the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Act of 2000, 5
CRIM. JUST. 405, 415, 420-21 (2005).
116. See Kaufmann & Pape, supra note 112, at 646.
117. See generally Kaufmann & Pape, supra note 112.
118. See Efrat, supra note 31, at 306-07.
119. See Stolz, supra note 115, at 420-21.
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ident, the State Department, and members of Congress. 121
To promote their cause, principled actors may also attempt
to educate the public and shape public opinion. Anti-slavery so-
cieties in Britain held public lectures, distributed literature, and
organized several mass petition drives. 2 ' American missionaries
fostered public opinion sympathetic to China's problems
through missionary and religious journals and through reports
to their churches. 1 22 The NGO coalition to eliminate conflict
diamonds produced numerous posters and leaflets and called
upon the public to ask governments and diamond companies to
establish effective controls. Consumers were encouraged to ask
jewelers about the exact source of the diamonds they were sell-
ing. 12 3
What allows the principled actors to educate publics as well
as policymakers is their expertise and knowledge about the trade
and in some cases their first-hand experience with the trade's
negative consequences. The dissemination of information is
therefore their key to gaining influence and shaping prefer-
ences. At times, information provision takes the form of a writ-
ten or filmed report. A 1969 article by archaeologist Clemency
Coggins focused public attention on antiquities looting in Latin
America and on the role of American museums in fueling the
plunder. 124 This expos6, coupled with several media scandals in-
volving museums, convinced U.S. policymakers to join and im-
plement the 1970 UNESCO Convention125 over the opposition
of antiquities dealers and some members of the museum com-
munity. 126 In 2000, the McDonald Institute for Archaeological
Research at the University of Cambridge published Stealing His-
tory: The Illicit Trade in Cultural Material.127 The report provided
a comprehensive survey of the illicit antiquities trade, its effects,
120. See TAYLOR, supra note 110, at 29.
121. Kaufmann & Pape, supra note 112, at 655-56.
122. TAYLOR, supa note 110, at 29.
123. Andrew Grant & Ian Taylor, Global Governance and Conflict Diamonds: The Kim-
berley Process and the Quest for Clean Gems, 93 THE ROUND TABLE: COMMW. J. INT'L REL.
385, 390 (2004).
124. See Clemency Coggins, Illicit Traffic of Pre-Columbian Antiquities, 29 ART J. 94
(1969).
125. See Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import,
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, supra Table I note h.
126. BATOR, supra note 15, at 1-4.
127. BRODIE ET AL., supra note 59.
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and the role played by Britain's art market. 12s The awareness it
created contributed to Britain's decision to accede to the 1970
UNESCO Convention in 2002. Another notable example are
Global Witness's reports which raised awareness about conflict
diamonds and played an important role in the international
campaign to control the diamond trade. 129
Although my analysis distinguished between primary and
secondary externalities, in certain situations governments may
face both. They may care about the trade's negative effects upon
their own countries as well as its impact on other countries. For
example, France and Germany are concerned about small arms
in Africa that threaten their own soldiers on peacekeeping oper-
ations. At the same time, they worry about the devastating con-
sequences of small arms proliferation for the African coun-
tries. " ° Principled actors may sometimes cast secondary exter-
nalities as primary externalities to bolster their case for action.
For example, American missionaries considered China's opium
problem to be a moral evil, but tried to appeal to policymakers
by emphasizing the detrimental effect of opium on U.S.-China
trade. 131
3. Negative Externalities: Conclusion
Negative externalities are the key distinction between my
model of IRGs and conventional trade models. In conventional
trade models, the motivation for regulation is to protect import-
competing sectors; 13 in my model, by contrast, regulation is
driven by the negative externalities of the trade. My model fur-
ther diverges from conventional trade models by incorporating
value-based concerns about secondary externalities. Morally-in-
spired concerns have, in fact, occupied an increasing role in
trade policymaking in recent years. The debate over developing
countries' access to affordable AIDS medications is but one nota-
128. Id.
129. Global Witness published A Rough Trade: The Role of Companies and Govern-
ments in the Angolan Conflict in 1998. In 2000 it released Conflict Diamonds: Possibilities for
the Identification, Certfication, and Control of Diamonds. Grant & Taylor, supra note 123, at
390, 392-93.
130. Asif Efrat, Regulating Rifles: International Efforts against the Illicit Trade in
Small Arms (Sept. 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
131. TAYLOR, supra note 110, at 29-31.
132. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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ble example."' 3 Yet conventional trade policy models remain in-
terest-based, failing to capture the growing weight of normative
convictions, values, and moral beliefs in trade policy. Conven-
tional trade models take into account only material factors such
as exporters' foreign market access, loss of income due to im-
port-competition, consumers' economic welfare, and politicians'
pursuit of votes and political contributions; yet they do not ad-
dress the influence of humanitarianism or human rights on
trade policy. Conventional models therefore cannot explain why
governments may choose to support international regulation
when it brings them no material gains and, furthermore, when
regulation undermines the interests of domestic actors to the
benefit of foreign countries. Those puzzles are resolved by
bringing into account value-based concerns, which motivate gov-
ernments' participation in international regulatory campaigns to
curb the externalities of trade abroad.
D. Expected Variation in Government Preferences on
International Regulation
The theoretical framework has introduced four influences
on government preferences: on the one hand, the interests of
exporters and consumers; and on the other hand, primary and
secondary negative externalities. The weight of these influences
will vary across governments as a function of different variables
such as: exporters' and consumers' level of political activity; the
magnitude of the trade's negative effects; and lobbying by princi-
pled actors.
Combining the four influences along two dimensions, as
shown in Figure 2, leads to an expectation of large variation in
government preferences on international regulation.
At one extreme are governments that are concerned about
primary or secondary negative externalities and do not face con-
siderable anti-regulation pressure from exporters or consumers
(Quadrant II). These governments will likely support stringent
international regulation, which offers them significant bene-
133. See, e.g., James Thuo Gathii, Construing Intellectual Property Rights and Competi-
tion Policy Consistently with Facilitating Access to Affordable AIDS Drugs to Low-End Consumers,
53 FLA. L. REv. 727 (2001). For more on the balance between trade and human rights,
see generally SUSAN ARIEL AARONSON & JANIE M. ZIMMERMAN, TRADE IMBALANCE: THE
STRUGGLE To WEIGH HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS IN TRADE POLICYMAKING (2008).
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Primary/Secondary Negative Externalities
Low High
1. II.
Weakly-affected Pro-regulation
governments governments
Moderate regulation
III. IV.
Anti-regulation Cross-pressured
governments governments
Support for regulation varies
Figure 2. Incentives affecting international regulation and expected
government preferences
fits-curbing the trade's negative externalities-with little cost.
At the other extreme are governments that have little concern
over the trade's negative effects on their own countries or on
foreign countries and are strongly influenced by exporters or
consumers who push for uncontrolled trade (Quadrant III).
Such governments are unlikely to support international regula-
tion, which brings them very little benefits in exchange for costs
to exporters or consumers. Furthermore, international regula-
tion requires these governments to pay the price of improved
law enforcement (for example, resources required for strength-
ening customs) to the benefit of foreign countries. Rather than
strengthening control, these governments would prefer its relax-
ation or elimination.
A third group includes those governments that have little
concern over primary or secondary externalities and face no
considerable anti-regulation pressure from exporters or consum-
ers (Quadrant I). These weakly-affected governments have
neither strong incentives to support international regulation nor
reasons to oppose it. I expect them to adopt a middle position
and favor moderate international regulation. Finally, a fourth
group includes cross-pressured governments (Quadrant IV). On
the one hand, primary or secondary negative externalities push
these governments toward supporting international regulation.
On the other hand, exporters or consumers pull them toward
unconstrained trade. I expect cross-pressured governments to
5-
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vary in their preferences. Their support for international regula-
tion will increase the heavier are the negative externalities. Sup-
port for regulation will decline the greater is the anti-regulation
influence of exporters or consumers.
It is important to note that preferences on international
regulation vary across governments for a particular good; but
they may also vary for the same government across different
goods. A specific constellation of exporters' and consumers' in-
fluence, coupled with certain negative externalities, may lead a
government to favor tight international regulation of the trade
in good X. A different constellation will lead the same govern-
ment to oppose regulation of the trade in good Y. For example,
the United States has played a leading role in establishing the
international drug and money laundering regimes. However,
the United States has not joined the Basel Convention on haz-
ardous wastes, nor does it endorse the international regulation
of the trade in small arms.
134
It is also important to point out that government prefer-
ences may vary over time. First, government change may lead to
a preference change. A government preference is the result of
balancing the negative externalities of the trade with pressure
from exporters or consumers. A new government in power may
be attentive to interest groups different than those that its prede-
cessor had privileged. A new government's ideological orienta-
tion may affect its concern about welfare abroad and make it
more or less willing to tackle secondary externalities. A new gov-
ernment may therefore weigh the competing influences differ-
ently than the previous one and strike a different balance. Sec-
ond, preferences may shift as a result of changes in the external
environment. Negative externalities that were initially small may
increase enough to overwhelm the anti-regulation influence of
exporters or consumers. Governments that previously faced
only pressure from exporters or consumers without negative ex-
134. On the U.S. efforts for international drug control see generally TAYLOR, supra
note 110 and DAVID BEWLEY-TAYLOR, THE UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL DRUG
CONT'ROL, 1909-1997 (1999). On the U.S. efforts against money laundering see gener-
ally Simmons, supra note 16. On the U.S. failure to ratify the Basel Convention see Lisa
Belenky, Cradle to Border: US Hazardous Waste Export Regulations and International Law, 17
BERKELEYJ. I,,r'L L. 95 (1999). On the U.S. approach to international small arms regu-
lation see Asif Efrat, Toward Internationally Regulated Goods: Controlling the Trade in Small
Arms and Light Weapons, IN'r'L ORG. (forthcoming).
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ternalities may become cross-pressured. For example, the
United States and Britain traditionally favored free trade in an-
tiquities, which served the interests of their art markets. Yet the
U.S. and UK governments became cross-pressured with respect
to antiquities in the early 1970s and late 1990s, respectively. As a
consequence of archaeologists' advocacy as well as scandals in-
volving the art market, the governments of both countries be-
came concerned about looting abroad, that is, the trade's secon-
dary externalities. Following the changed incentive structure,
both governments reversed their anti-regulation preference and
came to support modest international regulation of antiqui-
ties.135
A change in incentive structures that leads governments to
change their preferences and become more cooperative is rare.
In the more typical case, governments opposed to regulation
maintain their non-cooperative preference. Going back to Fig-
ure 2, the expected sharp divergence of preferences is a major
obstacle to an international regulatory agreement. International
cooperation typically builds on joint gains and at least a partial
convergence of interests among governments. International reg-
ulation, however, involves highly conflicting preferences and lit-
tle, if any, common ground. I now turn to examine whether and
how cooperation may be established when the underlying pref-
erences remain unchanged and certain governments are reluc-
tant to cooperate.
IV. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF COOPERATION
A. The Cooperation Problem
Conventional analysis of trade cooperation is of limited rele-
vance for the understanding of cooperation on IRGs. Most obvi-
ously, conventional trade agreements and IRG agreements have
opposite goals. Whereas the former aim to lower trade barriers
and liberalize trade, the purpose of the latter is to impose restric-
tions and make trade less free. More fundamentally, conven-
tional trade and IRGs are entirely different in terms of their un-
derlying cooperation problem.'36
135. Efrat, supra note 31, at 179-86, 261-67.
136. Heifer defines "problem structure" as including:
[T]he number of states involved, their incentives, the strategic interactions
they generate, the level of uncertainty, and asymmetries of information and
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Scholars have long conceived of trade cooperation as a pris-
oners' dilemma. 3 7 In a bilateral setting, both governments
would prefer protection at home and liberalization abroad, but
if the two governments choose protection, the resulting trade
war will leave them worse off. By contrast, if both governments
can agree to liberalize trade, both will reap gains. The problem,
however, is the enforcement of such an agreement. Even when
governments recognize that trade liberalization brings welfare
gains, they may be tempted to "cheat" by providing protection
contrary to their commitments. Trade agreements facilitate co-
operation and assuage concerns about cheating through various
means such as dispute settlement mechanisms and trans-parency. 381
Mutual gains motivate trade cooperation. The purpose of
trade negotiations and agreements is to allow all states involved
to enjoy the welfare gains of free trade. However, mutual gains
as the rationale of cooperation do not apply to IRGs. As ex-
plained above, the major winners from international regulation
are those governments that are concerned about the negative
externalities of the trade and are not pressured by exporters or
consumers of the goods. International regulation addresses
those governments' concerns without imposing significant costs.
Yet for governments that are pressured by exporters or consum-
ers while not concerned about the trade's externalities, regula-
tion is not welfare-enhancing. Rather, international regulation
would leave them worse off. As the trade does not adversely af-
fect their own countries or other countries they care about,
those governments have no interest in international control.
From their point of view, international control would only re-
strict the ability of exporters to make profit or the ability of con-
sumers to obtain the goods; it would also entail law enforcement
costs. For those governments, the preferred outcome is thus the
absence of international regulation-in other words, non-coop-
power. These factors help to predict the difficulty of establishing and sus-
taining collective action that improves states' individual and group welfare in
comparison to the alternatives of unilateral action or no action at all.
Lawrence Helfer, Nonconsensual International Lawmaking, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 98
(2008).
137. See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH & ERIC POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
139-141 (2005); OATLEY, supra note 47, at 56-58;John Conybeare, Public Goods, Prisoners'
Dilemmas, and the International Political Economy, 28 INT'L STUD. Q. 5 (1984).
138. OATLE', supra note 47, at 60-62.
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eration. Figure 3 depicts a payoff structure for the interaction
between pro-regulation and anti-regulation governments.
Government B
(Anti-regulation)
Liberalize Regulate
L,L L,R
00
R,L R,R
Preference Orders:
Government A: R,R > R,L > L,R > L,L
Government B: L,L > R,L > L,R > R,R
Figure 3. Payoff structure for pro-regulation and
anti-regulation governments
I illustrate the payoff structure through two examples. Con-
sider the preferences of Somalia (Government A) and China
(Government B) on the regulation of the small arms trade.
Somalia has experienced persistent instability, including civil
war, since the 1980s. The Somali government, interested in
preventing militias from obtaining arms, would gain the most
from Regulate/Regulate, wherein the trade is controlled on
both ends. Somalia regulates gun import, distribution, and pos-
session, and China regulates gun export (for instance, avoiding
gun sales if those might lead to instability and conflict). The
worst outcome for Somalia is liberalization on both ends. With
Liberalize/Liberalize, there are no restrictions on guns' import
to Somalia or their export from China, resulting in massive gun
proliferation in Somalia. The reverse is true for China. As a ma-
jor exporter of small arms interested in market access, China
gains the most from Liberalize/Liberalize. With Liberalize/Lib-
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eralize, China is free from restrictions on its exports and does
not meet with import restrictions on Somalia's side. The worst
outcome for China is Regulate/Regulate, wherein both Chinese
export control and Somali import control restrict the trade. The
equilibrium will therefore be R,L-Somalia regulates small arms
import and circulation, whereas China liberalizes exports.
A similar conflict of preferences characterizes the antiqui-
ties market. Consider the preferences of Mexico (Government
A) and Switzerland (Government B) on the regulation of the
antiquities trade. As a country suffering significant loss of antiq-
uities, Mexico gains the most from Regulate/Regulate, wherein
Mexican authorities control outflows of antiquities and Swiss au-
thorities control inflows. Liberalize/Liberalize-free trade in
antiquities-is the worst outcome for Mexico, resulting in deple-
tion of archaeological material. Whereas free movement of an-
tiquities is devastating for Mexico, Switzerland-a major art mar-
ket-would benefit from unregulated trade. Liberalize/Liber-
alize would supply Switzerland's auction houses with an
abundance of antiquities, whereas regulation by both Mexico
and Switzerland would seriously disrupt the flow of antiquities
and cause financial loss. In equilibrium, Mexico regulates the
export of antiquities, whereas Switzerland liberalizes import.
In contrast to conventional trade, the root of the coopera-
tion problem for IRGs is not incentives to defect; rather, it is the
absence of incentives to cooperate in the first place. Coopera-
tion on IRGs simply does not promise mutual gains. Whereas
for some governments international regulation is very beneficial,
for others it is highly undesirable. As the examples above show,
certain governments consider absence of any control (mutual
defection) their preferred outcome, whereas control on both
sides (mutual cooperation) is their worst outcome. Those gov-
ernments would choose liberalization regardless of what other
governments do. Such ranking of preferences and the absence
of mutual gains from cooperation are very different from the
Prisoners' Dilemma typical of conventional trade.
IRGs thus involve a more intense political conflict than con-
ventional trade. The cornerstone of conventional trade cooper-
ation is the realization that free trade involves joint gains and
could make all actors better off. The absence of such shared
interest is the primary obstacle to international regulation. Far
from providing gains, cooperation on IRGs may leave certain
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governments worse off. To be sure, conventional trade negotia-
tions may be difficult and acrimonious as well. The controver-
sies obstructing the Doha Round are but one example. 139 Yet at
their core, conventional trade talks build on partial convergence
of interests, mutual benefits, and at least a rough consensus on
the goal-trade liberalization. These are often absent when in-
ternational regulation is on the agenda. In that case, certain
governments would favor the non-cooperative status quo over
cooperation. Rather than strengthening control, their prefer-
ence would be its relaxation or elimination.
Given the irreconcilable differences among governments,
the distribution of power plays a key role in shaping the coopera-
tive outcome. Put differently, in the absence of shared interest
the cooperative outcome likely reflects the preferences of the
powerful actors. Weak governments favoring cooperation lack
the means to bridge the preference gap and bring powerful gov-
ernments to accept regulation inconsistent with those govern-
ments' preferences. The resulting international regulation is
thus likely to be weak. By contrast, powerful governments favor-
ing cooperation can establish stronger regulation, given their
ability to impose their preferences on weak governments.
B. Weak Governments Favor Cooperation
IRG agreements do not meet the Pareto condition. 4 °
While they offer benefits to some governments, they make
others worse off, in particular governments of externalities-gen-
erating countries. When those made worse off are powerful gov-
ernments, they may simply decline to join the agreement. Since
the weak governments favoring cooperation have no leverage vis-
.A-vis the powerful governments that are reluctant to cooperate,
the latter will remain outside the agreement.
The governments of China, Russia, India, and Pakistan,
have sided with their militaries' assessments that landmines are a
necessity. Considering landmines essential for national security,
they have refused to support a comprehensive ban on
139. On the Doha Round, see Sungjoon Cho, Doha's Development, 25 BERKELEYJ.
INT'L L. 165 (2007).
140. An outcome is Pareto optimal when no single actor can be made better off
without at the same time making another actor worse off. See OATLEY, supra note 47, at
58.
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landmines.1" The United States has also recoiled from ac-
cepting the landmine prohibition. It did state its goal to reduce
the humanitarian risk posed by landmines, but stopped short of
accepting the total ban "which would have required [the United
States] to give up a needed military capability."' 4 2 All five coun-
tries have not joined the landmine convention.'43
The major market countries for antiquities have shown little
enthusiasm about the 1970 UNESCO Convention, which asked
them to strengthen their control over the movement of archaeo-
logical material. Among other art market countries, Britain,
Germany, and Japan took more than thirty years to ratify the
Convention. 144 None of the three have ratified a second-and
more far-reaching-agreement on antiquities: the 1995
UNIDROIT Convention.
The 1989 Basel Convention was a response to the growing
shipment of hazardous wastes to developing countries, which
turned them into dumping grounds. This Convention would
have required the United States, a major exporter of hazardous
wastes, to tighten its restrictions on the export of hazardous
wastes and to broaden the class of wastes subject to control. The
Convention ultimately failed to achieve ratification by the Sen-
ate. 1
4 5
In all three cases above, governments of powerful countries
have simply refused to join agreements that not only offered no
gains, but also threatened to impose costs on militaries, art mar-
kets, or industries generating hazardous wastes. In other cases,
however, the conflict of preferences may be tempered when
powerful governments identify certain benefits from interna-
tional regulation alongside the large costs it entails. In those
141. Richard Price, Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land
Mines, 52 INr'L ORG. 613, 635-36 (1998).
142. Fact Sheet, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, New
United States Policy on Landmines: Reducing Humanitarian Risk and Saving Lives of
United States Soldiers (Feb. 27, 2004), available at http://www.fas.org/asmp/
campaigns/landmines/FactSheet NewUSPolicy_2-27-04.htm.
143. See U.N. Office at Geneva, Landmine Convention State Parties and Signato-
ies, http://www.unog.ch/ (follow "Disarmament" hyperlink; then follow "Anti-Person-
nel Landmines Convention" hyperlink; then follow "States Parties and Signatories"
hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 20, 2009).
144. On the British approach to the UNESCO Convention, see HOUSE OF COM-
MONS CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT SELECT COMMITrEE, CULTURAL PROPERTY: RETURN
AND ILLICIT TRADE, REPORT, Vol. 1, xx-xxiii (2000); Efrat, supra note 31, at 252-97.
145. Belenky, supra note 134, at 120-25.
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cases, powerful governments are slightly cooperative, agreeing to
make only small changes to their behavior. They may join the
regulatory agreement after shaping it in a manner consistent
with their preference for modest regulation. Given that their
countries generate the externalities and hence their cooperation
is essential, these governments enjoy superior bargaining power,
allowing them to weaken the agreement in terms of its level of
legalization and/or substantive obligations. For example, the
United States could gain from international small arms regula-
tion by reducing the risk that gun proliferation poses to Ameri-
can soldiers overseas. Yet at the same time, international regula-
tion could be harmful to American gun manufacturers; could
jeopardize the interests of civilian gun owners; and could restrict
the ability of the U.S. government to provide arms to foreign
non-state actors. Going back to Figure 2, the United States is a
cross-pressured government with respect to small arms regula-
tion, facing modest pro-regulation incentives and strong anti-
regulation incentives. The United States therefore insisted on
an international regulatory framework for small arms that is not
legally binding; does not include a meaningful enforcement
mechanism; and excludes major issues: regulation of ammuni-
tion, restrictions on arms transfers to non-state actors, and limi-
tations on civilian possession of small arms. This weak frame-
work-the 2001 Program of Action on Small Arms-may bring
the United States small gains without posing a serious threat to
its interests.146 This document, however, does not effectively ad-
dress the devastating problem of gun violence in Africa.
In summary, when international regulation benefits weak
governments, powerful governments are either completely unco-
operative (if they have nothing to gain) or are only slightly coop-
erative (if they do identify modest gains). They either do not
join the regulatory agreements or join significantly-weakened
agreements. In either case, the utility of international regulation
is seriously compromised.
C. Powerful Governments Favor Cooperation
When the governments seeking to curb the trade's external-
ities are powerful, they may exploit their power advantage to es-
tablish regulation contrary to the wishes of weaker governments
146. Efrat, supra note 130.
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that would have preferred to maintain the trade uncontrolled;
they may also use their power advantage to exert pressure for
compliance with the regulatory agreement. How can power
overcome the heterogeneity of preferences on international reg-
ulation?
One mechanism is issue linkage, by which "multiple issues
are included in the final settlement in an effort to create a bal-
ance where both sides gain enough to accept the costs."' 47 In
principle, there is nothing to inhibit weak governments from es-
tablishing an issue-linkage. Yet in practice, powerful govern-
ments are more likely to make use of issue-linkage as a means to
bridge the preference gap obstructing international regulation.
As Davis points out, "[olne challenge for successful linkage is
finding complementary issues" to offset loses.' 48 Powerful gov-
ernments have a clear advantage in terms of possible comple-
mentary issues to offer to weaker governments. It is easier for
them to combine issues so that all participants can gain from the
agreement. Furthermore, a proposed linkage is likely to en-
counter vigorous resistance from governments influenced by do-
mestic interest groups that oppose regulation. Powerful govern-
ments can use pressure or inducements to motivate reluctant
governments to withstand the domestic opposition and accept
the linkage. The same cannot be said about weaker govern-
ments attempting to create a linkage.
Given that powerful governments can more easily establish
an issue-linkage, it is not surprising that the single most success-
ful linkage in the context of international regulation was initi-
ated by industrialized countries, led by the United States, as part
of their efforts against counterfeit and pirated goods. To gain
developing countries' consent for TRIPS, industrialized coun-
tries embedded the agreement within the WTO, linking it to ag-
ricultural and textiles trade liberalization, which developing
countries expected to benefit from.'49
A second mechanism that powerful governments may em-
ploy for overcoming preference heterogeneity is coercion.
Through rewards and punishments, powerful governments can
147. Christina Davis, International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for
Agricultural Trade Liberalization, 98 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 153, 156 (2004).
148. Id.
149. SELL, supra note 102, at 109-10.
15132009]
1514 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 32:1466
increase the benefits of cooperation or the costs of non-coopera-
tion and thereby induce weaker governments to accept and com-
ply with stronger regulation than they would have preferred. In
a small number of cases, coercion involved the use of military
force. Prior to World War I, Germany and Turkey-both drug-
exporting countries-refused to join the international drug re-
gime. After their military defeat, however, they had to join and
implement the 1912 International Opium Convention as part of
the postwar peace agreements. 150 A more contemporary case of
military coercion is the U.S. invasion of Panama and the over-
throw of Manuel Noriega. Panama's involvement in drug traf-
ficking was among the chief reasons for the invasion. 15 1
While the use of military force to coerce IRG cooperation
has been rare, the American operation in Panama is typical in
another respect: the United States as the coercing state. U.S.
power and influence have been necessary for achieving coopera-
tion on some IRGs, since international regulation requires sig-
nificant altering of the costs and benefits that anti-regulation
governments face. Anti-regulation governments have little to
gain from international regulation, which hurts exporters or
consumers, requires allocation of resources for law enforcement,
and does not yield benefits in return. To overcome the resis-
tance of anti-regulation governments and stimulate cooperative
behavior, non-cooperation has to become very painful. Only
powerful external incentives can compel governments to accept
international regulation against the interests of politically influ-
ential domestic actors. In the post-World War II era, and in par-
ticular after the Cold War, the United States has had the ability
to manipulate the incentives of reluctant governments, bringing
them to accept and comply with international regulation. The
United States exerts IRG-motivated coercion bilaterally and
through international institutions. Coercion takes two forms:
the first, economic coercion, is a well-established tool of state-
craft; 15 2 the second and more innovative tool is reputational co-
150. TAYLOR, supra note 110, at 141-44; see Treaty of Peace Between the Allied Pow-
ers and Turkey (Treaty of Lausanne) art. 100, July 24, 1923, 28 L.N.T.S. 11; Treaty of
Peace between the Allied and Associate Powers and Germany (Treaty of Versailles) art.
295, June 28, 1919, 225 Consol. T.S. 188.
151. Fighting in Panama: The President; A Transcript of Bush's Address on the Decision to
Use Force in Panama, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1989, at A19.
152. See, e.g., DAVID BALDWIN, ECONOMIC STATECRAF-r (1985); LISA MARTIN, COER-
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ercion-the intentional tarnishing of countries' reputation
through blacklisting.
1. Economic Coercion
To force acceptance of and compliance with international
regulation, the United States exerts economic coercion through
withholding of aid, punitive trade measures, and other financial
tools. Such means affect governments' calculations by escalating
the economic costs of non-cooperation or the benefits of coop-
eration. Once governments realize they gain more from cooper-
ation than from non-cooperation, they have an economic moti-
vation to join the international regulatory efforts.
The use of economic coercion has been an integral part of
the U.S. War on Drugs. In 1969, President Nixon forced Mexico
to tackle marijuana and heroin production through a temporary
closure of the U.S.-Mexico border (Operation Intercept). The
resulting massive disruption to trade convinced Mexican author-
ities to confront the drug issue. 53 In the mid-1980s the United
States formalized and systematized the use of economic coercion
with the introduction of the Narcotics Certification Process.
This process involves the submission of an annual presidential
report to Congress. In the report, known as the "Majors List,"
the President identifies all major illicit drug producing countries
and major drug-transit countries; certifies those countries that
have taken appropriate anti-drug measures, especially those re-
quired by the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances; and
designates those countries that have "failed demonstrably" to
make substantial efforts toward taking the required measures.
Countries found to have "failed demonstrably" face a series of
penalties, among them withholding of fifty percent of non-hu-
manitarian aid and a mandatory "no" vote by the United States
on loans from six multilateral development banks.' 54 U.S. coer-
CIVE COOPERATION: EXPLAINING MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS (1992); Daniel
Drezner, The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion, 57 INT'L ORG. 643 (2003).
153. BEwLEY-TAYLOR, supra note 134, at 199-200.
154. See Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2291h-j. The President's de-
termination of the Majors List is based on the annual State Department's International
Narcotics Control Strategy Report ("INCSR"). Volume I of the INCSR addresses drug
and chemical control activities. The Reports are available at http://www.state.gov/p/
inl/rls/nrcrpt/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2009).
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cion proved effective for the Andean strategy in the early 1990s.
Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru-at first reluctant to embrace in-
creased U.S. military involvement in their anti-drug efforts-suc-
cumbed to the American demands under the threat of aid with-
drawal.15 5
The use of economic coercion to compel IRG cooperation
is not limited to drugs. Annual blacklists also identify non-coop-
erative countries on money laundering, human trafficking, and
counterfeiting/piracy, resulting in possible penalties. Countries
designated by the Financial Action Task Force ("FATF") as non-
cooperative on money laundering could face counter-measures
with serious financial consequences.' 5 6 The USA Patriot Act au-
thorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to take similar measures
against countries considered "of primary money laundering con-
cern."1 57 The Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act
requires governments to meet minimum standards for the elimi-
nation of human trafficking and threatens to withhold U.S. aid
from governments that do not comply with those standards or
make significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance.15 8
Countries that fail to make efforts to protect intellectual prop-
erty rights and eliminate counterfeit/pirated goods may face
U.S. trade sanctions under Section 301 of the Trade Act.' 59
155. BEWLEY-TAYLOR, supra note 134, at 192-93.
156. Key among those counter-measures is a recommendation to financial institu-
tions to "give special attention to business relationships and transactions with ... coun-
tries which do not or insufficiently apply the FATF Recommendations." FATF Recom-
mendation 21, http://www.fatfgafi.org (follow "40 Recommendations" hyperlink) (last
visited Apr. 12, 2009). The first Report on Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories,
14 February 2000 and annual reviews thereafter, are available at http://www.fatfgafi.org
(follow "Publications" hyperlink; then follow "NCCT Reports" hyperlink); see also Benja-
min R. Hartman, Coercing Cooperation from Offshore Financial Centers: Identity and Coinci-
dence of International Obligations Against Money Laundering and Harmful Tax Competition,
24 B.C. INr'L & COMP. L. REV. 253, 254-58 (2001).
157. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56,
§ 311, 115 Stat. 272, 298-304 (2001).
158. VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING AND VIOLENCE PROTECTION Act, Pub. L. No. 106-386,
§§ 108-10, 114 Stat. 1464, 1480-84 (2000). The annual State Department Trafficking in
Persons Reports determine whether governments have made the required efforts to
combat human trafficking. U.S. Dep't of State Trafficking in Persons Reports, http://
www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/.
159. United States Trade Representative ("USTR") Special 301 Report is an an-
nual review of the global state of intellectual property rights protection and enforce-
ment. Countries found to have provided inadequate intellectual property rights protec-
tion may face sanctions. See supra note 60.
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2. Reputational Coercion
Governments feel the impact of being blacklisted through
their pocket. Penalties resulting from inclusion on a blacklist,
such as withholding of aid or trade sanctions, impose direct ma-
terial costs. If those costs overwhelm the benefits of non-cooper-
ation, reluctant governments will likely accept international reg-
ulation and comply with it. However, direct economic penalties
are not the only outcome of blacklisting. Countries designated
as non-cooperative by the United States (or FATF) may suffer a
serious blow to their reputation as well.' 60 Tier 3 Countries in
the State Department Trafficking in Persons Report (countries
whose governments do not fully comply with the minimum stan-
dards for the elimination of human trafficking and are not mak-
ing significant efforts to do so); Priority Foreign Countries in the
USTR Special 301 Report on intellectual property (countries
with "the most onerous and egregious acts, policies, and prac-
tices which have the greatest adverse impact ... on the relevant
U.S. products [and are] not engaged in good faith negotia-
tions . . . to address these problems"); "Countries of Primary
Concern" in the State Department report on money launder-
ing;161 and countries identified by the President as having "failed
demonstrably" in meeting their counter-narcotics obligations; all
receive bad labels that tarnish their reputation.
"Naming and shaming" those who violate standards of ap-
propriate behavior is not a unique American tactic, of course.
Shaming is also one of the popular means in the arsenal of the
NGO community. NGOs often attempt to exert pressure on vio-
lators of human rights through international publicity. 6 2 Sham-
ing by NGOs, however, fails to achieve the desired effect on state
practice in many cases and is rarely followed by the cessation of
political terror. 163 I argue that shaming through U.S. blacklist-
160. I use the term reputation in the sense of global standing or popular percep-
tion of the state with a global audience, rather than reputation for compliance. On the
distinction between the two see Rachel Brewster, Unpacking the State's Reputation
(Nov. 2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
161. Money laundering is the subject of Volume II of the International Narcotics
Control Strategy Reports. See generally INCSR, supra note 154.
162. See, e.g., MARGARET KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, AcrlvlsTs BEYOND BORDERS: AD-
vocAcY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998); Price, supra note 141, at 635;
Wexler, supra note 20.
163. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human
Rights Enforcement Problem, 62 IN"T'L ORG. 689 (2008).
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ing is more coercive in nature and more likely to be effective
than shaming by NGOs. U.S. (and FATF) blacklists have greater
coercive impact due to their authoritativeness, institutionaliza-
tion, and conditionality.
Blacklists carry significant weight since their source-the
U.S. Government or an international organization (FATF)-is
widely considered to be authoritative. Unlike NGO-criticized
governments, blacklisted governments cannot simply brush off
the American rebuke as coming from a marginal or extremist
source. The status of the United States as the sole superpower
reflects on the condemnations it issues against governments fail-
ing to meet standards of appropriate behavior. Since their
source is the U.S. government, such condemnations are more
likely to receive attention and serious consideration. They are
more likely to be seen by audiences worldwide as credible judg-
ments of governments' conduct.
The institutionalization of U.S. (and FATF) blacklists is an-
other factor contributing to their reputational impact. Blacklists
are prepared and published annually. They are the result of sys-
tematic review processes with worldwide coverage, relying on
multiple sources of information. The comprehensiveness and
thoroughness of the review processes endows blacklists with le-
gitimacy. With global coverage and the inclusion of U.S. allies
on the lists, criticized governments cannot simply denounce
blacklists as ill-motivated targeting of U.S. foes. As they are
backed by detailed evidence, blacklists are difficult to dismiss as
unfounded accusations. Moreover, continuous monitoring on
an annual basis raises the pressure by constantly reminding audi-
ences about the failure of non-cooperative governments to im-
prove their conduct. An institutionalized process is therefore
much more harmful to governments' reputation than occasional
negative press coverage.
Finally, the conditional nature of blacklists magnifies incen-
tives for cooperation by rewarding improved behavior and penal-
izing deteriorating behavior. U.S. blacklists are based on clear
and explicit standards of good conduct. They identify particular
faults in governments' behavior and make specific demands for
addressing them. Governments are aware that meeting those de-
mands will result in a better ranking, whereas continued failure
to meet the requirements could diminish their standing. For in-
stance, the State Department rewards Tier 2 countries that make
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progress in combating human trafficking by moving them up to
Tier 1. Persistent lack of progress or worsening record, on the
other hand, could move Tier 2 countries down to Tier 2 Watch
List and even Tier 3. The implied threat and promise combined
with clear and specific requirements offer governments more
powerful incentives for changed behavior than critical media
coverage. Governments who know precisely what is expected of
them and can see immediate results to their efforts through bet-
ter ranking have stronger motivation for cooperation.
Similar to economic coercion, tarnished reputation may in-
fluence governments through negative material consequences.
For example, Colombia's decertification in 1997 due to insuffi-
cient efforts to control drug traffickers unsettled the economy
and deterred much needed foreign investment. 164 Reputational
coercion, however, may also affect governments through various
mechanisms that do not involve a direct manipulation of cost/
benefit calculations. Policymakers may be psychologically moti-
vated "to avoid the sense of shame or social disgrace that com-
monly befalls those who break" '65 international norms. The op-
probrium associated with norm breaking may cause them cogni-
tive discomfort and a blow to self-esteem. Governments
interested in maintaining their international status and prestige
may wish to avoid being blacklisted; the same for governments
concerned about the impact of negative reputation on their do-
mestic legitimacy.' 66
As explained earlier, the magnitude of such non-material
effects, and hence their coercive impact, are larger for U.S.
blacklists than for other forms of shaming. In fact, governments
may be more concerned about the reputational effects of black-
lists than about their immediate material implications. Al-
though the United States threatens to withhold aid from coun-
tries ranked as Tier 3 in the State Department Trafficking in Per-
sons Report, Israeli officials have considered aid withholding
unlikely. For them, the primary consequence of Israel's Tier 3
164. BEWLEY-TAYLOR, supra note 134, at 203.
165. Oran Young, The Effectiveness of International Institutions: Hard Cases and Criti-
cal Variables, in GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GovERINMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD
POLITICS 160, 177 (James Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992).
166. For a review of the micro-processes of social influence see for example lain
Johnston, Treating International Institutions as Social Environments, 45 INT'L STUD. Q. 487
(2001).
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ranking in the 2001 Report was reputational. The U.S. blacklist
seriously hindered Israel's efforts to foster the positive image of a
country that respects human rights. In an attempt to rehabili-
tate its good name, Israel stepped up the efforts against human
trafficking and advanced to Tier 2 the following year. 167
V. CONCLUSION
Free trade is one of the most important principles of the
world economy. Accordingly, the trade literature has been fo-
cusing on the lowering of trade barriers and facilitation of com-
merce. This Article, in turn, has examined the opposite trend:
growing restrictions and prohibitions on potentially harmful
trade. The Article has brought under one framework coopera-
tive agreements from different issue-areas and has emphasized
the underlying political conflict that they share. This conflict
stems from the wide preference gap between anti-regulation gov-
ernments that benefit from uncontrolled trade and pro-regula-
tion governments interested in curbing the trade's externalities.
The source of these conflicting preferences is in the domestic
political arena, where the public, exporters, consumers, and civil
society all shape governments' views. Another important aspect
of the theory is the integration of rationalist and non-rationalist
approaches. In forming their preferences on international regu-
lation, governments respond to material influences, such as ex-
porters' or consumers' pressure, yet they may also hold value-
based concerns for the welfare of foreign countries.
The Article has focused on the large heterogeneity of gov-
ernment preferences as the primary obstacle to international
regulation. Preference heterogeneity, however, is not the only
obstacle to the international efforts against problems like gun
violence, antiquities looting or counterfeiting. Lack of capacity
may also hinder these efforts. Many developing countries simply
do not have enough resources to enforce their laws fully, guard
their borders effectively, or detect and seize the relevant goods.
Even in developed countries those goods often elude customs
inspection. Another impediment is uncertainty. Information
about smuggling routes or the operations of traffickers, for ex-
ample, is difficult to gather. Finally, international cooperation
between law enforcement agencies faces multiple obstacles, such
167. Efrat, supra note 31, at 330-52.
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as incompatibility of national databases and inadequate informa-
tion exchange. And yet the key problems are those highlighted
by this Article: the large variation in national preferences over
international regulation and the reluctance of certain govern-
ments to address the trade's externalities. When common inter-
est exists, governments can work together to enhance capacity
and overcome uncertainty. Yet if certain governments identify
only costs and no gains from international regulation; if the
linchpin of cooperation-shared interest-is absent; joint inter-
national action becomes infinitely more difficult to establish.
What are the policy implications of the theory? As I have
explained above, powerful governments interested in regulation
can overcome the problem of preference heterogeneity through
coercion. Employing coercion, however, is not an option for
weak governments wishing to promote international regulation.
Those governments may find that the global regulatory agree-
ment fails to meet their needs, either because the powerful gov-
ernments generating the externalities have not joined it or be-
cause the agreement has been watered down considerably to al-
low the powerful governments to join. When this is the case,
weak governments can focus on bolstering national controls as
well as strengthening regional cooperation, where consensus is
more easily achieved than at the global level. Consider small
arms, for example. National and regional regulation of small
arms may be the only viable option for the African countries,
given that the primary global framework-the Program of Ac-
tion on Small Arms-fails to provide an adequate response to
the scourge of gun violence. National and regional efforts, how-
ever, are only a second-best solution. An effective response to
the problem of trade externalities must involve the externalities-
generating countries and tackle the externalities at their source.
National or regional efforts that do not address the source of the
externalities cannot fully substitute for global regulation. An al-
ternative solution would entail awareness-raising activities in-
tended to educate publics and policymakers about the harmful
effects of uncontrolled trade abroad. Fostering concern about
the trade's negative impact abroad (secondary externalities) may
ultimately lead anti-regulation governments to reverse their posi-
tion.
In addition to policy implications, this Article has theoreti-
cal implications for three bodies of literature. The Article speaks
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most directly to the literature on illicit trade and international
crime control. 168 This literature has addressed activities like the
drug trade and human trafficking as issues of crime; efforts
against them have thus been studied from a policing and law
enforcement perspective. This study, by contrast, has examined
these commercial activities through the lens of trade and regula-
tion. This new theoretical perspective on the subject has en-
hanced our understanding of actors' motivations and of cooper-
ative outcomes.
Second, the Article suggests that trade policy preferences
are shaped by a larger variety of influences than those the trade
literature has focused on. Interest groups demands are at the
heart of conventional trade policy models, and consumers' wel-
fare figures into governments' calculations as well. This study
has introduced additional influences on trade policy: the nega-
tive effects of trade on society, value-based concerns, and the
government's own interest as exporter or consumer. These in-
fluences, in particular value-based motivations, should become
an integral part of trade policy analysis. As human rights issues
become closely linked with trade,169 trade policy models can no
longer be based solely on material factors, without taking into
account values and moral views.
Finally, this Article has implications for the international
law and cooperation literature at large. Much of this literature
takes mutual interest in cooperation as its point of departure
and examines how states establish cooperation given their
shared interest.170 Yet shared interest, as the foundation of co-
operation, is absent in the case of international regulation.
When certain governments face a massive gun or drug problem
while other governments make profit by supplying these goods,
there is little common ground. The primary difficulty is there-
fore the highly conflicting preferences of governments and the
large gap between governments that benefit considerably from
168. See, for example, NAtM, supra note 5; ANDREAS & NADELMANN, supra note 24;
Tomer Broude & Doron Teichman, Outsourcing and Insourcing Crime: The Political Econ-
omy of Globalized Criminal Activity, 62 VAND. L. REv. (forthcoming 2009).
169. AARONSON & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 133.
170. For example, the Rational Design Project addressed the question, "If states
want to promote a common interest, what kind of institutions might they design to aid
their efforts?" Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson & Duncan Snidal, The Rational De-
sign of International Institutions, 55 INT'L ORG. 761, 768 (2001).
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international regulation and those that stand to lose. We risk
overlooking this major obstacle if we take the mutual gains as-
sumption as the premise of our analysis. Assuming that a treaty
benefits all governments would prevent us from realizing that for
certain governments a treaty could mean only costs and no
gains. The general theoretical point is therefore that mutual
gains and shared interest should be problematized, rather than
assumed. Analysis of discord should not begin by asking why
states failed to capture joint gains. Instead, the starting point
should be: Are there any joint gains to capture? Collective ac-
tion problems can impede cooperation and so can uncertainty,
but at times the obstacle is more fundamental. Different govern-
ments may simply want very different things.
